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In 1994, the Governor of New Jersey pardoned a dog. In 2017, the Governor 
of Maine did the same. Each of these dogs had been ordered to be euthanized af-
ter killing another dog. While the Governor of New Jersey relied on the property 
status of the dog in issuing her order, the Governor of Maine relied on his stand-
ard pardon power, despite the fact that the being to be pardoned was a dog ra-
ther than a human. Both of these cases generated a great deal of popular press 
and attention, and a few months ago, a New York state senator petitioned his 
state’s Governor to pardon a dog in a similar situation. 
Against the backdrop of these novel but increasingly frequent actions, this 
Article is the first to consider extending the pardon power to nonhuman animals, 
and the expressive function such an act might carry with it. The Article begins by 
examining the roots of the pardon power, exploring the breadth of that power 
based on constitutional text. It also describes the motivations and ideas that ani-
mate the pardon power, and ties them to recent cognitive studies showing that 
many nonhuman animals have the ability to feel emotions like grief and regret. 
The Article then takes a broader, more normative look at a decision to pardon a 
dog. It considers what impact that decision could have on the laws and norms 
that govern the treatment of nonhuman animals. Here, it examines the different 
expressive functions that are furthered by a true, “full and free” pardon as com-
pared to a form of pardon that relies upon the property status of the nonhuman 
animal. This comparison animates a key debate in the animal law literature: 
whether nonhuman animals should be viewed as more akin to property or per-
sons under the law. The Article argues that important values are served when a 
chief executive publicly states that animals are the proper subjects, and worthy, 
of pardons. These values—including that nonhuman animals are deserving of 
moral consideration and forgiveness—could eventually help shift the law toward 
a paradigm that treats animals more like persons and less like things. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 118 
 I. THE PARDON POWER ........................................................................... 122 
 A. The Federal Pardon Power ......................................................... 122 
 B. The Pardon Power and the States: The Example of Maine ......... 125 
 C. Remittitur of Forfeiture: The Example of New Jersey ................. 128 
 D. Institutional Design ...................................................................... 130 
 E. Problems with the Pardon Power: Why Pardoning Dogs 
Might Not Be the Best Way to Respond to Euthanization 
Orders .......................................................................................... 131 
 II. NONTRADITIONAL PARDONS ............................................................... 135 
21 NEV. L.J. 117 
118 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:1  
 III. NONHUMAN ANIMALS AND THE COURTS ............................................ 142 
 A. A Long History of Animal Trials .................................................. 142 
 B. Modern Day Animal Trials: Dangerous Dog Hearings .............. 145 
 IV. THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR APPLYING THE PARDON POWER TO 
NONHUMAN ANIMALS ......................................................................... 150 
 A. History and Morality, Culpability and Capacity ......................... 150 
 B. The Expressive Function of Pardoning Nonhumans: Norm 
Change and Something More Than Mere Property ..................... 153 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 159 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2017, the Governor of Maine pardoned a dog.1 The dog, a Siberian 
Husky named Dakota, had gotten loose and killed a neighbor’s small dog, and 
then subsequently got loose again and acted aggressively toward the same 
neighbor’s new dog.2 After the first attack, there was a hearing at which Dakota 
was deemed a “dangerous dog.”3 After the second incident, Dakota was picked 
up as a stray, and was sent to a local humane society.4 While in the care of the 
humane society, she was well behaved and passed aggressive dog testing.5 She 
was subsequently adopted out.6 
 
*  Associate Dean for Research and Edward S. Godfrey Professor of Law, University of 
Maine School of Law. Thanks to the law school faculties of Fordham University and Florida 
International University for inviting me to present this paper. I am grateful to Ben Levin, 
Justin Marceau, Anthony Moffa, Thea Johnson, Kellen Zale, Jennifer Wriggins, David 
Rosengard, and Justin Steil for their helpful comments. Thanks also to Nathan Raab and Al-
lison Kuhns for excellent research assistance, and Matthew Liebman and Anthony Eliseuson 
of the Animal Legal Defense Fund for bringing me into this discussion. 
1  See generally, Nik DeCosta-Klipa, Paul LePage Pardons a Dog that was Sentenced to 
Death, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.boston.com/news/politics/2017/03/30/paul 
-lepage-pardons-a-dog-that-was-sentenced-to-death [https://perma.cc/PKH7-CGW9] (report-
ing on Governor’s pardon). 
2  Id. 
3  Id.; When such a determination is made, certain restrictions are put in place with respect to 
how a dog is to be kept, which was done here. For example, Maine’s dangerous dog statute 
provides that, upon finding a dog to be dangerous, a court may require the owner to post 
signs, confine the dog in a secure enclosure, only allow the dog out of the enclosure with a 
muzzle, require the owner to keep liability insurance, or have the dog evaluated by a canine 
behaviorist or dog trainer. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 3952-A(C)–(F), (I)–(J) (West, 
Westlaw through 2019 2d Reg. Sess.). 
4  Betty Adams, Dakota the Dog’s Life Spared Under Court Deal, KENNEBEC J. (July 24, 
2017), https://www.centralmaine.com/2017/07/24/dakota-the-dogs-life-is-spared/ [https://per 
ma.cc/49D5-Y5DQ]. 
5  While at the humane society, Dakota “was ‘a model resident,’ according to a March 24, 
2017 letter from shelter director Lisa Smith, as well as ‘extremely people friendly and gener-
ally dog friendly.’ ” Id. 
6  Id. 
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In the meantime, and unbeknownst to the humane society or the new 
adopter,7 a new dangerous dog hearing had taken place based on the second at-
tack. The court then issued an order imposing a fine on Dakota’s previous own-
er and ordering that Dakota be euthanized.8 At this point, someone with con-
nections to both the humane society and the state’s Governor asked him to 
intervene.9 He did so, and issued a pardon wherein he asserted that “Dakota the 
Dog, was sentenced to death pursuant to” the state’s dangerous dog statute, and 
continued, “I do hereby grant Dakota the Dog a Full and Free Pardon respect-
ing such offense.”10 
Although the use of the pardon power in a case like this might seem odd, 
Maine’s LePage is not the only governor to have overruled a death sentence for 
a dog. In New Jersey in 1993, a court ordered a dog named Taro to be eu-
thanized under a similar state dangerous dog statute.11 Taro had purportedly bit-
ten the niece of his guardian, after having previously attacked three dogs, kill-
ing one of them.12 Taro was ordered “destroyed,”13 and was then kept in a jail 
 
7  Id. There is some question about the truth of this statement. The new adopter was the 
mother of the ex-girlfriend of Dakota’s former guardian. Id. It is unclear whether the former 
guardian was aware that the dog had been adopted out again. 
8  Id. The euthanization order was issued pursuant to Maine’s “Dangerous Dog” statute. ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 3952(1)(B) (West, Westlaw through 2019 2d Reg. Sess.) (amended 
2018) (“If, upon hearing, the court finds that the dog is a dangerous dog . . . the court shall 
impose a fine and shall: . . . Order the dog to be euthanized if it has killed, maimed or inflict-
ed serious bodily injury upon a person or has a history of a prior assault or a prior finding by 
the court of being a dangerous dog”). Of note, this section was repealed effective Aug. 1, 
2018; the new section 3952-A states  
If, upon hearing, the court finds that a dog is a dangerous dog, the court shall impose a fine and 
may order any one or more of the following that the court determines is appropriate: A. Order 
the dog to be euthanized if the court finds that the dog: (1) Has killed, maimed or inflicted seri-
ous bodily injury upon a person or has a history of a prior assault or a prior finding by the court 
of being a dangerous dog; and (2) Presents a clear threat to public safety[.]  
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 3952-A(2) (West, Westlaw through 2019 2d Reg. Sess.). 
9  Adams, supra note 4; The humane society was located in Waterville, the town where 
LePage used to be mayor. About Governor Paul R. LePage, MAINE.GOV, https://www.maine. 
gov/governor/lepage/about/index.html [https://perma.cc/LB7Y-W5VB]. 
10  DeCosta-Klipa, supra note 1; Governor of the State of Maine, Warrant of Full and Free 
Pardon for Dakota the Dog (Mar. 30, 2017); see also Motion of Governor LePage to Inter-
vene, or, in the Alternative, to File Amicus Brief, and Incorporated Memorandum of Law at 
2, State v. Perry, No. VI-17-20053 (Me. Dist. Ct. July 19, 2017) (“the Governor issued an 
order remitting the euthanization pursuant to Art. 5, pt. 1, § 11 of the Maine Constitution.”). 
The case wound up settling, so the validity of the Governor’s pardon was never conclusively 
determined. See infra notes 43–47 and accompanying text (describing the court’s handling of 
LePage’s pardon). 
11  Ready for a Milk-Bone Last Meal?, PEOPLE MAG. (Dec. 13, 1993, 12:00 PM), 
https://people.com/archive/ready-for-a-milk-bone-last-meal-vol-40-no-24/ [https://perma.cc/ 
MJ7Y-UDZD]. “An animal control officer is authorized to seize and impound any potential-
ly dangerous dog whose owner fails to comply with the provisions of [N.J. STAT. §§ 4:19–17 
et seq. (2020)] . . . The municipal court may order that the dog so seized and impounded be 
destroyed in an expeditious and humane manner.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:19–29 (2020). 
12  Ready for a Milk-Bone Last Meal?, supra note 11.  
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cell at the Bergen County jail in New Jersey where he was issued a prisoner 
number during the pendency of appeals in his case.14 New Jersey’s Governor, 
Christine Todd Whitman, relied upon the pardon provision in the New Jersey 
Constitution, which is similar to that in Maine.15 Governor Whitman issued an 
Executive Order, directing remittitur of the euthanization of the dog,16 with 
conditions including removal from the state.17 
Whitman’s action was colloquially referred to in the popular press as a 
“pardon,”18 and it had the effect of freeing Taro. However, Whitman relied on 
the status of dogs as personal property in issuing her order. She asserted that 
the euthanasia order was akin to a forfeiture order (the forfeiture of the property 
here being the dog), which she was empowered to remit.19 Governor Whitman 
stated, “While I can’t pardon the dog, I can forgive the forfeiture taking and 
under that scenario, Taro can go free.”20 Her spokesperson went further, stating, 
“There is no clemency for anything other than a two-legged creature . . . [the 
Governor] wanted to end it. This was a legal way to do it.”21 
In New Jersey, there was no apparent case law on the subject of pardoning 
an animal. Further, as will be addressed below, nothing in the language of the 
state constitution appears to limit the pardon power to humans, or persons, or 
 
13  Kate Stone Lombardi, Pardoned in Jersey, Taro Incognito, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 1994), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/20/nyregion/pardoned-in-jersey-taro-incognito.html [http 
s://perma.cc/V3KW-QHNJ]. 
14  Ready for a Milk-Bone Last Meal?, supra note 11 (describing the jail life of Taro, Prison-
er No. 914095). 
15  N.J. CONST. art. V, § 2 (“The Governor may grant pardons and reprieves in all cases other 
than impeachment and treason, and may suspend and remit fines and forfeitures. A commis-
sion or other body may be established by law to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise 
of executive clemency.”). 
16  N.J. EXEC. ORDER No. 7 (Jan. 28, 1994); At the time of Taro’s pardon, the local govern-
ment had spent approximately $60,000 on court fees, boarding expenses, and dog food. Al-
ice Steinbach, A Death Sentence Is Rescinded, and the Heart Rejoices, BALT. SUN (Feb. 9, 
1994), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1994-02-09-1994040161-story.html [htt 
ps://perma.cc/K7QF-SK8W]. 
17  N. J. EXEC. ORDER No. 7 (Jan. 28, 1994). 
18  See, e.g., Katie Sykes, Human Drama, Animal Trials: What the Medieval Animal Trials 
Can Teach Us About Justice for Animals, 17 ANIMAL L. REV. 273, 302 (2011) (noting that 
Taro “was eventually pardoned by then-Governor Christine Todd Whitman”). 
19  N. J., EXEC. ORDER No. 7 (Jan. 28, 1994) (noting that “N.J.S.A. 2A:167-5 provides that 
any person who has suffered a forfeiture may make application for the remission of such for-
feiture, ‘which application the governor may grant by order signed by her!’ ”); see also JOHN 
A. MCKINSEY & DEBRA D. BURKE, CARPER’S UNDERSTANDING THE LAW 267 (7th ed. 2015) 
(noting that Whitman used an executive order “in lieu of a ‘pardon,’ which is a remedy re-
served for human beings.”). 
20  Jerry Gray, Dog’s Death Sentence is Reduced to Exile, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 1994), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/01/29/nyregion/dog-s-death-sentence-is-reduced-to-
exile.html [https://perma.cc/QB5G-6XJ2]. 
21  Id. 
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those who have committed crimes.22 Therefore, it seems that the only reason 
that Governor Whitman believed she could not issue a formal pardon for Taro 
was because she did not believe that a dog was the proper subject of a pardon. 
Thus, both Taro in New Jersey and Dakota in Maine were spared from 
death, in part, due to the action of the state’s governor.23 The New Jersey ap-
proach tread familiar ground, valuing the animal only in relation to its status as 
the property of a human, while the Maine approach seemed to recognize the in-
herent value of the animal. Of course, it is quite possible that Maine’s Governor 
LePage issued this pardon not because he holds any particular views with re-
spect to animal rights, but because he holds an expansive view of executive 
power, or wanted good press. But, intentionally or not,24 the pardon framing in 
Maine stands in contrast to the forfeiture framing in New Jersey, and the two 
approaches present different normative concerns and serve different expressive 
values, especially considering these differing approaches from an animal rights 
perspective. 
In this Article, I assert that there is both a descriptive and normative case 
for recognizing the ability of a governor to pardon a dog, and that such an ap-
proach will do more to change norms pertaining to animal rights than remitting 
a forfeiture. Although some might argue that this is not an appropriate use of 
the pardon power, nor is it the most straightforward path toward pursuing 
greater rights for animals,25 it is clear that some elected officials have chosen to 
pursue this path. Thus, this Article is the first to interrogate the use of the par-
don power to free a nonhuman animal.26 
In Part II, the Article addresses the pardon power generally. It begins with 
a brief history of the pardon power, and the reasons for its existence. It exam-
ines both the federal pardon power and its state level counterparts in consider-
ing the power’s origin and constraints. It also considers the chief executive’s 
 
22  See N.J CONST. art. V, § 2 (The N.J Constitution allows pardons “in all cases other than 
impeachment and treason”).  
23  See Gray, supra note 20 (“The 5-year-old Akita was saved from execution by order of the 
Governor”). Of course, there was never a definitive ruling on the propriety of the Maine 
Governor’s pardon, and the case settled. Thus, it is possible the same result would have oc-
curred even if he had not intervened. However, it is also possible that his pardon caused the 
public to become aware of the case, caused newspaper articles to be written, and in the end 
made settlement more likely. However, Dakota’s freedom was not a direct result of LePage’s 
pardon. 
24  See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 
2050–51 (1996) (discussing the expressive function of law, and noting that intent is not nec-
essary). 
25  Importantly, this Article does not seek to convince the reader that using the pardon power 
to free a dog is necessarily the best method of either ensuring that the dog is not killed, or of 
seeking greater rights for animals. Nor does it seek to argue that the legal case for pardoning 
a dog is ironclad. 
26  “[T]he expressive function of law has a great deal to do with the effects of law on prevail-
ing social norms. Often law’s ‘statement’ is designed to move norms in fresh directions.” 
Sunstein, supra note 24. 
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power to remit a forfeiture, which is typically found in constitutional provisions 
governing the pardon power. This Part concludes by addressing some of the 
problems with reliance on the pardon power. 
Part III presents examples of nontraditional pardons that have been issued 
in the past. These include other animal pardons (such as the pardon of the 
Thanksgiving turkey), symbolic pardons, mass pardons, and posthumous par-
dons. These examples are instructive because they present scenarios wherein 
the standard justifications for the pardon power do not map neatly onto its use.  
Part IV considers the relationship between animals and the courts. There is 
a long history in this country and others of putting animals on trial for wrongs 
they have purportedly committed. A modern-day corollary to this past practice 
exists in the form of dangerous dog hearings, such as those to which Dakota 
and Taro were subjected. This Part examines this history and considers what 
motivates the law to take action against animals themselves. 
Part V provides a normative case for extending the pardon power to non-
human animals. Here, the Article looks to the future and considers whether, by 
extending the pardon power, states and their governors could help to normalize 
the idea that animals are beings worthy of moral and ethical consideration. The 
Article suggests that the evolution of animal law as a field—which is being 
taken seriously by commentators and some courts in recent years—along with 
the broad discretion afforded by the pardon power, provides the legal footing 
for extending the power in this way. Further, it analyzes the powerful expres-
sive function of the pardon power, and explains that, when used to free nonhu-
mans, it could lead to norm change concerning the place of animals in the 
law.27 Thus, the pardoning of nonhuman animals could be another step along 
the path toward granting something more than mere property status—perhaps 
even personhood—to all sentient beings. 
I. THE PARDON POWER 
A. The Federal Pardon Power 
The power to pardon others is a broad power.28 It seeks to find a balance 
between equity and punishment, with justice as the goal. There are a number of 
factors animating the decision to pardon someone. These include mercy, for-
 
27  Of course, not everyone agrees that laws carry an expressive function that will lead to ac-
tual change. See, e.g., id. at 2021 (“We are all Expressionists part of the time. Sometimes we 
just want to scream loudly at injustice, or to stand up and be counted. These are noble mo-
tives, but any serious revolutionist must often deprive himself of the pleasures of self-
expression. He must judge his actions by their ultimate effects on institutions.” (quoting 
HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MY LIFE 281 (1991)). 
28  Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 380 (1866) (noting the breadth of the pardon power, 
which “extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its 
commission”). 
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giveness, equity, adaptation, common sense, and good public policy.29 Accord-
ing to Blackstone, the power allows the chief executive discretion to “extend 
mercy, wherever he thinks it is deserved . . . [and] soften the rigour of the gen-
eral law.”30 Alexander Hamilton justified the pardon power in the Federalist 
Papers by stating that,  
Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign prerogative of 
pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed. The criminal 
code of every country partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an 
easy access to exceptions in favour of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a 
countenance too sanguinary and cruel.31 
The chief executive holds this power, which is derived from the king’s 
clemency power.32 The power rests there because, according to James Iredell—
who would later become a Supreme Court Justice—in certain cases, someone 
would need to make a decision that would relax the strictures of the law.33 It 
made sense for that power to be vested in the President due to the peoples’ con-
fidence in him.34 Hamilton agreed, stating that a “single man” would “be a 
more eligible dispenser of the mercy of government than a body of men.”35 
Since the formation of the country, Presidents have used their pardon pow-
er in pursuit of what they deem to be good public policy. For example, George 
Washington used the power to defuse conflict over the Whiskey Rebellion, ex-
pressing his desire to “temper the administration of justice with a reasonable 
extension of mercy . . . .”36 In the aftermath of the Civil War, President Andrew 
Johnson provided a “universal amnesty and pardon” to all those who participat-
 
29  See, e.g., Statement of James Iredell, in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 111 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d 
ed. 1836) (“[T]here may be many instances where, though a man offends against the letter of 
the law, yet peculiar circumstances in his case may entitle him to mercy. It is impossible for 
any general law to foresee and provide for all possible cases that may arise; and therefore an 
inflexible adherence to it, in every instance, might frequently be the cause of very great in-
justice.”). 
30  WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, BOOK THE FOURTH 
390 (4th ed. 1770). 
31  THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 553 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1864). 
32  State v. Hunter, 447 A.2d 797, 802–03 (Me. 1982). 
33  Statement of James Iredell, supra note 29. 
34  Id. (“Where could [the pardon power] be more properly vested, than in a man” who by 
election to the highest office in the land “had received such strong proofs of his possessing 
the highest confidence of the people?”).  
35  THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, supra note 31 (“As the sense of responsibility is always strong-
est, in proportion as it is undivided, it may be inferred, that a single man would be most 
ready to attend to the force of those motives, which might plead for a mitigation of the rigour 
of the law, and least apt to yield to considerations, which were calculated to shelter a fit ob-
ject of its vengeance.”). 
36  Presidential Pardon of the Ten Ringleaders of the Whiskey Rebellion, Who Had Been 
Convicted of High Treason, THE GILDER LEHRMAN INST. OF AM. HIST., https://www.gilderleh 
rman.org/collections/911c547e-f8de-449f-a6d5-845432753124 [https://perma.cc/V48H-TU 
D5]. 
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ed in the Confederate cause during the Civil War.37 He justified the pardon by 
claiming that it would “tend to secure permanent peace, order, and prosperity 
throughout the land, and to renew and fully restore confidence and fraternal 
feeling among the whole people, and their respect for and attachment to the Na-
tional Government, designed by its patriotic founders for the general good.”38 
In each of these instances, the executive’s decision to grant a pardon represents 
“the determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be bet-
ter served” by avoiding the punishment.39 
Part of the reason that the pardon power is so broad is because the execu-
tive is vested with nearly unfettered discretion. At least at the federal level, the 
Founders did not appear to implicitly constrain this power. There is no evi-
dence that they expected the pardon power to be used only in certain circum-
stances (the exception to this is that the Constitution limits the pardon power to 
“offenses against the United States”).40 Rather, the purpose of the power was to 
allow the nation to adapt to unexpected circumstances by allowing the Presi-
 
37  Andrew Johnson, December 25, 1868—Granting Full Pardon and Amnesty to All Persons 
Engaged in the Late Rebellion, LIBR. OF CONG., http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.rbc/rbpe.23602600 
[https://perma.cc/22BN-MDRH].  
38  Id.; See also Gerald R. Ford, Proclamation No. 4311—Granting Pardon to Richard Nix-
on, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamatio 
n-4311-granting-pardon-richard-nixon [https://perma.cc/5SZV-8L43] (pardoning ex-
President Nixon so as to prevent “prolonged and divisive debate over the propriety of expos-
ing to further punishment and degradation a man who has already paid the unprecedented 
penalty of relinquishing the highest elective office of the United States”); See KATHLEEN 
DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 81–82 (1989) (describ-
ing President Carter’s pardon of all who had dodged the draft during the Vietnam War as one 
intended “to bind the wounds that an unpopular war had inflicted on society and on its young 
people, so that healing could begin”). 
39  Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927). 
40  While the pardon power is broad, it is not unlimited. Blackstone stated that the power ap-
plied in criminal cases. BLACKSTONE, supra note 30. However, the Supreme Court has made 
a more specific distinction: “An executive may pardon and thus relieve a wrongdoer from 
the punishment the public exacts for the wrong, but neither executive nor legislature can 
pardon a private wrong, or relieve the wrongdoer from civil liability to the individual he has 
wronged.” Angle v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Co., 151 U.S. 1, 19 
(1894); see also Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668 (1892) (noting that private wrongs 
are “an infringement or privation of the private or civil rights belonging to individuals, con-
sidered as individuals; and are thereupon frequently termed civil injuries: [public wrongs] 
are a breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect the whole community, 
considered as a community”). Thus, at base, pardons cannot extinguish civil liability; the 
President can only pardon offenses against the State, not against individual citizens. But see 
Noah A. Messing, A New Power?: Civil Offenses and Presidential Clemency, 64 BUFF. L. 
REV. 661, 661 (2016) (arguing that presidents may pardon civil offenses as well as criminal 
ones); Peter L. Markowitz & Lindsay Nash, Pardoning Immigrants, 93 N.Y.U L. REV. 58, 63 
(2018) (arguing that “the President may pardon any federal civil penalty but may not use his 
pardon power to relieve individuals of applications of civil regulatory qualifications.”). Fur-
ther, the President cannot pardon state offenses, be they criminal or civil. See, e.g., Samuel 
T. Morison, Presidential Pardons and Immigration Law, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 253, 278 
(2010) (“the pardon power extends only to ‘[o]ffenses against the United States,’ as distin-
guished from civil penalties or state offenses.”). 
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dent, or chief magistrate, to unilaterally prevent punishment from taking place 
if he or she deemed such measures appropriate.41 
B. The Pardon Power and the States: The Example of Maine 
Just as the pardon power in the U.S. Constitution gives this right to the 
President, state constitutions generally vest the pardon power in the state’s 
chief executive, the governor.42 Of importance to this Article, to the extent the 
pardon power might be extended to nonhuman animals, it will likely happen at 
the state level rather than the federal, as it has in the two case studies consid-
ered here. 
As was mentioned above, the Governor of Maine attempted to use his 
state-constitutionally-derived pardon power to pardon a dog. However, the Dis-
trict Attorney in the case appeared to ignore or reject the Governor’s pardon, 
and continued pursuing execution of Dakota’s euthanasia order.43 The State set 
forth three reasons for ignoring the pardon: (1) because there had been no con-
viction in Dakota’s case, the Governor lacked the authority to grant a pardon; 
(2) even if he had the authority, he failed to comply with relevant statutory pro-
cedural requirements; and (3) when the court had previously discussed the 
Governor’s pardon power, it had addressed his ability to pardon “a person after 
criminal conviction.”44 The court appeared to agree.45 This failure to take his 
pardon seriously caused the Governor to intervene in the case.46 In the end, a 
 
41  THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, supra note 31 (“[T]he benign prerogative of pardoning should be 
as little as possible fettered or embarrassed.”). 
42  Henry Weihofen, Legislative Pardons, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 371, 372 (1939) (“[T]he consti-
tutions of every state except Connecticut specifically confer power to grant pardons upon the 
governor, either alone or with the help of an advisory pardon board or pardon attorney, or 
upon a board of which the governor is a member.”); But see GA. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (execu-
tive pardon is handled by a State Board of Pardons and Paroles whose members are appoint-
ed by the Governor). 
43  The State asserted that the Governor lacked authority to issue the pardon here because 
there had been no conviction, and because he failed to follow correct procedure in doing so. 
See State’s Objection to Motion to Vacate by Interested Party, State v. Perry, No. 17-20053 
(Kennebec Dist. Ct., Apr. 10, 2017). 
44  Id. (“[S]ection 11 gives the Governor the power to ‘remit after conviction’. Here there has 
been no conviction so the Governor has no authority to grant such a pardon . . . Assuming 
that the Governor does have the authority to issue a pardon for a dog, the Governor has 
failed to comply with the requirements of the statute.”). 
45  See Adams, supra note 4 (noting that Judge ignored LePage’s pardon). 
46  See Motion of Governor LePage to Intervene, or, in the Alternative, to file Amicus Brief, 
and Incorporated Memorandum of Law, Maine v. Perry, No. VI-17-20053 (Me. Dist. Ct. 
2017); Governor LePage had filed a motion to intervene in order to “defend his full power to 
grant pardons.” Adams, supra note 4. In a letter to the state’s attorney general requesting to 
do so, he stated,  
As you know, the ancient power of Executive Clemency is very broad and is a power that the 
People of the State of Maine have vested in the Chief Executive. With this in mind, I strongly 
believe it is my constitutional duty and obligation to defend this important power in court. 
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settlement was reached—so there was no final determination regarding the va-
lidity of LePage’s pardon—and the court ordered Dakota to be moved to a 
farm.47 
Although many states have rejected the U.S. Constitution’s broad under-
standing of the pardon power, Maine has not.48 An examination of the legisla-
tive history of the Maine constitution suggests little concern with the pardon 
power and does not demonstrate any intent to deviate from the understanding of 
the Federal power.49 The Maine power, however, does not include the language 
of the U.S. Constitution limiting the pardon power to offenses against the Unit-
ed States. Thus, the textual hook, which in the U.S. Constitution is read to re-
strict the pardon power, is absent in the Maine constitution. 
In Maine, the pardon power derives from Article 5, Section 11 of the 
Maine Constitution: 
The Governor shall have power to remit after conviction all forfeitures and pen-
alties, and to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, except in cases of im-
peachment, upon such conditions, and with such restrictions and limitations as 
may be deemed proper, subject to such regulations as may be provided by law, 
relative to the manner of applying for pardons. Such power to grant reprieves, 
commutations and pardons shall include offenses of juvenile delinquency.50 
 
Letter from Paul LePage, Governor of Maine, to Janet Mills, Att’y Gen. of Maine (July 10, 
2017) (on file with author). According to news reports, the Judge was not interested in the 
pardon. “At the hearing, [Judge] Stanfill said she wasn’t considering the pardon, although it 
wasn’t clear if she merely hadn’t seen it or if she thought it was invalid.” Michael Shepherd, 
Dog Pardon Again Proves LePage is the Alpha in Maine’s Power Structure, BANGOR DAILY 
NEWS (Apr. 23, 2017), https://bangordailynews.com/2017/04/23/politics/dog-pardon-again-
proves-lepage-is-the-alpha-in-maines-power-structure/ [https://perma.cc/FL7V-T29J]. 
47  See Judy Harrison, Judge Agrees to Deal That Allows Pardoned Husky to Live, BANGOR 
DAILY NEWS (July 24, 2017), https://bangordailynews.com/2017/07/24/news/judge-agrees-
to-deal-that-allows-pardoned-husky-to-live/ [https://perma.cc/LR4J-7LLY]. There, Dakota 
was to be evaluated by an expert who would sign off on her next home. However, her new 
home could not be in the town where she previously lived. Id. 
48  See generally John Dinan, The Pardon Power and the American State Constitutional Tra-
dition, 35 POLITY 389 (2003) (discussing U.S. rejection of the “Hamiltonian model” of the 
pardon power and imposition of various restrictions on the power). See also In re Pardoning 
Power of Governor and Council, 27 A. 463, 464 (Me. 1892); Bossie v. State, 488 A.2d 477, 
480 (Me. 1985) (“[Section 11] prevents the legislature from controlling, regulating, or inter-
fering with Governor’s pardoning powers.”). 
49  None of the records of the debates on the original Maine Constitution, or any pardon-
related amendments thereto, betray any concern with the pardon power. In most cases, 
amendments to the pardon power passed without any debate whatsoever. See generally THE 
DEBATES AND JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF MAINE, 
1819–’20, AND AMENDMENTS SUBSEQUENTLY MADE TO THE CONSTITUTION (1894), 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.35112203450061&view=1up&seq=15 
[https://perma.cc/4JNR-8T7A] (record of the debates at the Maine Constitutional Conven-
tion). Debate on more recent amendments is available at the Maine legislature’s website. 
50  ME. CONST. art. V, § 11. 
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As is apparent, the Governor’s power under Section 11 is broad; it relates 
not just to pardons, but to “forfeitures and penalties” as well.51 Further, the lan-
guage “remit after conviction” appears to modify only “forfeitures and penal-
ties,” thus there is at least an argument that there need not be a criminal convic-
tion before the Governor may issue a pardon.52 That said, there are relevant 
state statutes that seem to assume that pardons relate only to criminal convic-
tions.53 According to Marshall Tinkle, an expert on the Maine state constitu-
tion, “[u]nder this section, governors have complete discretion in exercising 
any power of clemency for whatever reasons they deem appropriate.”54 How-
ever, Tinkle also believes that the power to pardon is generally understood to 
apply only to criminal convictions and not to administrative proceedings.55 In-
deed, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court found that in Maine, “the chief execu-
tive, acting for the public welfare and the benefit of the convict, has complete 
discretion and may exercise his [pardon] power for whatever reasons he thinks 
appropriate.”56 
Thus, the pardon power in the state of Maine is not unlimited, but it is 
broad in both scope and reach. The commentary surrounding its breadth in 
combination with the textual ambiguity suggests that a governor could at least 
arguably attempt to use the power to pardon a nonhuman animal.57 A governor 
 
51  See, e.g., In re Pardoning Power of Governor and Council, 27 A. at 463–64 (noting that 
the pardon power can be used at any time, including long after a sentence or conviction). 
52  It appears, however, that the state believes the entire constitutional provision applies only 
to criminal offenses. See State’s Objection to Motion to Vacate by Interested Party, supra 
note 43 (“[Section] 11 gives the Governor the power to ‘remit after conviction.’ Here, there 
has been no conviction so the Governor has no authority to grant such a pardon.”). 
53  See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 2161 (2020) (“On all petitions to the Governor for par-
don or commutation of sentences, written notice thereof shall be given to the Attorney Gen-
eral and the district attorney for the county where the case was tried . . . .”); ME. REV. STAT. 
tit. 15, § 2163 (2020) (“In any case in which the Governor is authorized by the Constitution 
to grant a pardon, he may, upon petition of the person convicted, grant it upon such condi-
tions and with such restrictions and under such limitations as he deems proper . . . .”). 
54  MARSHALL J. TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE CONSTITUTION 120 (2d ed. 2013) (emphasis add-
ed and citation omitted). 
55  Email from Marshall Tinkle, Attorney, Thompson, MacColl, & Bass, to author (Aug. 25, 
2019 8:01 AM) (on file with author); see, e.g., Theodoro v. Dep’t Liquor Control, 527 
S.W.2d 350, 353 (Mo. 1975) (holding that, under the Missouri constitution, the power to 
pardon did not extend to the administrative revocation of a liquor license, though the Mis-
souri constitution used the term “offense”).  
56  State v. Hunter, 447 A.2d 797, 802 (Me. 1982) (emphasis added). This language, of 
course, assumes a conviction. See Bossie v. State, 488 A.2d 477, 480 (Me. 1985) (“[Section 
11] prevents the legislature from controlling, regulating, or interfering with Governor’s par-
doning powers.”); State v. Sturgis, 85 A. 474, 477 (Me. 1912) (“[T]he power to pardon, to 
commute penalties, to relieve from the sentences of the law imposed as punishments for of-
fenses against the state, which power has not been given to the courts [are] confided exclu-
sively to the Governor of the state . . . .”). 
57  Dangerous dog hearings sometimes have elements that resemble criminal trials. See infra 
Section III.B. Further, the dog at issue in New Jersey was held in jail and given a prisoner 
number. Supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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with a broad conception of executive power would be even more likely to read 
the power in this way.58 
C. Remittitur of Forfeiture: The Example of New Jersey 
As was mentioned above, constitutional provisions that govern the pardon 
power also often give chief executives the power to remit a forfeiture. Forfei-
ture is a process through which a person “lose[s] ownership of an asset because 
that asset was used to facilitate illicit activity, or [was] received or derived from 
illicit activity.”59 Some commentators have suggested that the power to remit a 
forfeiture is part of the pardon or clemency power.60 However, unlike a pardon, 
the remission of a forfeiture means that the governor has the power to return 
property that has been taken from a person.61 The New Jersey Governor’s “par-
don” of a dog was technically styled as the remittitur of a forfeiture. 
New Jersey’s relevant constitutional provision reads,  
 
58  See, e.g., Marina Villeneuve, LePage Legal Fights Tested Limits, Cost Maine $900,000, 
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Jan. 5, 2019), https://www.pressherald.com/2019/01/05/lepage-
legal-fights-tested-limits-cost-maine-900000/ [https://perma.cc/P7G3-9CPF] (describing 
LePage’s assertive use of executive power). 
59  U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ASSET FORFEITURE POLICY MANUAL 37 (2019). The forfeiture of a 
“dangerous dog” would seem to be a “remedial” forfeiture rather than a punitive one. Scott 
A. Hauert, Comment, An Examination of the Nature, Scope, and Extent of Statutory Civil 
Forfeiture, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 159, 183 (1994) (“One purpose of remedial forfeiture 
statutes is to confiscate property that is inherently dangerous or illegal to possess.” (internal 
citations omitted)); cf. id. at 184 (“Punitive civil forfeiture statutes are those which cannot be 
explained as having the sole purpose and effect of removing dangerous or illegal property 
from public . . . . Rather, the purpose of such statutes is to punish the property owner for us-
ing the property in an illegal manner.”); but see City of Cleveland v. Lupica, No. 83912, 
2004 WL 2340639, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2004) (“[The Court is] unpersuaded by 
appellant’s argument that the humane destruction of a vicious dog is equivalent to a forfei-
ture of contraband requiring compliance with [the forfeiture statute].”). 
60  Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power From the 
King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 577 (1991) (“The clemency power also embraces remission of 
fines and forfeitures.”); WILLIAM J. RICH, 3 MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: GOVERNMENT 
STRUCTURE § 38:27 (3d ed. 2019) (“The pardoning power extends . . . to the remission of 
fines, penalties, and forfeitures. The power to pardon should not be limited by distinctions 
between ‘civil’ and ‘criminal’ penalties; property which has been seized by the government 
can be restored so long as third-party interests in the property have not vested.” (citations 
omitted)); Messing, supra note 40, at 712 (“[A] ‘pardon’ can include the remission of a fine 
or forfeiture that is unrelated to any criminal act.”); Pollock v. Bridgeport Steam-Boat Co. 
(The Laura), 114 U.S. 411, 414 (1885) (“[T]he President, under the general, unqualified 
grant of power to pardon offenses against the United States, may remit fines, penalties, and 
forfeitures of every description arising under the laws of [C]ongress.”); Executive Revision 
of Judicial Decisions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2020, 2033 (1996) (“When used to remit fines, 
penalties, and forfeitures, the pardon power can restore property as well as liberty . . . .”); 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1498 (1833) 
(“[T]he power of pardon is general and unqualified, reaching from the highest to the lowest 
offences. The power of remission of fines, penalties, and forfeitures is also included in 
it . . . .”). 
61  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:167–5 (2020). 
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The Governor may grant pardons and reprieves in all cases other than impeach-
ment and treason, and may suspend and remit fines and forfeitures. A commis-
sion or other body may be established by law to aid and advise the Governor in 
the exercise of executive clemency.62 
As with the language in the Maine Constitution, the language here is 
vague. There is an argument that in Maine, the Governor could only remit 
criminal forfeitures, as the constitutional language there states that the power 
exists “to remit after conviction all forfeitures . . . .”63 That type of limiting lan-
guage is not present in New Jersey. Thus, it seems likely that the Governor’s 
power is applicable to both civil in rem forfeitures and criminal in personam 
forfeitures, which are brought in conjunction with a defendant’s criminal pros-
ecution.64 
In the case of a dangerous dog determination, the dog would be forfeited 
by his or her guardian not in conjunction with a criminal prosecution of that 
guardian, but because of a dangerous dog determination due to a harm commit-
ted by the dog him or herself.65 Assuming the dog is not capable of committing 
a criminal act, requiring the euthanization of a dog would seem to be a civil for-
feiture.66 Indeed, one dangerous dog statute expressly stated that, “[i]f, upon 
 
62  N.J. CONST. art. V, § 2. 
63  ME. CONST. art. V, § 11 (emphasis added). 
64  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:167–5 (2020) (Restoration of right of suffrage and other rights; 
suspension or remission of fine: “Any person who has been convicted of a crime and by rea-
son thereof has been deprived of the right of suffrage or of any other of his civil rights or 
privileges, or upon whom there has been imposed a fine or who has suffered a forfei-
ture . . . may make application for the restoration of the right of suffrage or of such other 
rights or privileges or for the suspension or remission of such fine or forfeiture, which appli-
cation the governor may grant by order signed by him.” (emphasis added)).  
65  See Hauert, supra note 59, at 159–60 (“The enduring fictional aspect of civil forfeiture 
that had allowed it to prosper was its ‘ascribing to the property a certain personality.’ This 
personified property included ‘a power of complicity’ and the ability to be found ‘guilty.’ 
Actions against personified property are in rem. Historically, in rem actions were considered 
to be strictly against the ‘guilty’ property, not the owner.” (internal citations omitted)); see 
also Amy A. Breyer, Comment, Asset Forfeiture and Animal Cruelty: Making One of the 
Most Powerful Tools in the Law Work for the Most Powerless Members of Society, 6 
ANIMAL L. REV. 203, 207 (2000) (“The notion that the property itself was guilty simply 
evolved into the belief that the forfeiture is justified ‘on the notion that the owner has been 
negligent in allowing his property to be misused and that he is properly punished for that 
negligence.’ Modern scholars offer a somewhat more practical, if not mundane, explanation: 
the purpose of an in rem forfeiture is to ask the court to recognize a change in the ownership 
of the property.” (internal citations omitted)). 
66  See Settle v. Commonwealth, 685 S.E.2d 182, 186 (Va.  Ct. App. 2009) (finding that for-
feiture of a dog in a dangerous dog proceeding was a civil forfeiture of the animal). Animals 
are property under the law, but they have agency, and thus present a unique situation in the 
context of forfeiture. One commentator has noted the same problems in the context of ro-
bots:  
But civil asset forfeiture is a different case than robot forfeiture because civil forfeiture more of-
ten involves objects (money, cars, goods) rather than agents (animals and robots). A robot is the 
cause of harm in a way that a (human-driven) car cannot be. The car is a mere tool of a human 
who intends or negligently does harm, but an autonomous robot is not merely a tool of another 
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hearing, the court finds that the dog is a dangerous dog . . . the court may im-
pose a civil forfeiture and shall: . . . Order the dog to be euthanized . . . .”67 This 
statutory language suggests that a euthanization order would generally be 
viewed as a form of civil forfeiture. Thus, the New Jersey Governor appears to 
have believed that the state constitutional provision, quoted above, gave her the 
power to remit civil forfeitures (and thus halt the euthanization), but that it did 
not give her the power to issue a full and fair pardon for a dog.68 
D. Institutional Design 
As was discussed above, the pardon power is vested in the Executive 
Branch because the Chief Executive was deemed more capable of making the 
sophisticated public-policy determinations that the pardon power demands than 
the judiciary or the legislature.69 Thus, the arguments and ideas presented in 
this Article are those that the Executive should have the chance to sort through 
in determining who is deserving of the pardon. As commentators have noted, 
the fact that the pardon power is so broad “creates grave risks that the demo-
cratic process can be subverted through the discretionary and potentially self-
serving actions of the president.”70 Indeed, at the Virginia Ratifying Conven-
tion, George Mason voiced such concerns, stating that the President 
ought not to have the power of pardoning, because he may frequently pardon 
crimes which were advised by himself. It may happen, at some future day, that 
he will establish a monarchy, and destroy the republic. If he has the power of 
 
but is itself an agent. Just as the law sometimes sanctions euthanizing dangerous dogs over the 
objections of their owners, the law might reasonably say that robots who have caused certain 
kinds of harm are also forfeit from their owners. 
Christina Mulligan, Revenge Against Robots, 69 S.C. L. REV. 579, 594 (2018) (citation omit-
ted). Further, dangerous dog statutes that require inquiry into whether a dog’s conduct was 
justified or reasonable seem to be engaging in some combination of mens rea and affirmative 
defense analysis, as would be applicable to an agent, not an object. 
67  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 3952(1)(B) (West, Westlaw through 2019 2d Reg. Sess.) 
(amended 2007) (containing language from a former version of Maine’s dangerous dog stat-
ute); see Griggs v. Mayor, Etc., of Macon, 30 S.E. 561, 562 (Ga. 1898) (“[T]he power to 
regulate the keeping of dogs, and to enforce such regulations by forfeitures, fines, and penal-
ties, is recognized as within the police power.” (quoting 1 DILL MUN. CORP. 212 (4th ed.))). 
68  Supra notes 20, 21 and accompanying text (discussing the Governor’s statements sur-
rounding why she could not pardon the dog).  
69  The legislature is involved in these decisions in some states. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. V, 
§ 124 (West, Westlaw through Dec. 2018) (as amended by Amendment 38). Though some 
concern was raised at the Constitutional Convention, it was decided that the president would 
not break the law or commit an act of treason against the country, and thus the power was 
not limited. See James N. Jorgensen, Federal Executive Clemency Power: The President’s 
Prerogative to Escape Accountability, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 345, 345 (1993); William F. 
Duker, The President’s Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 475, 503 (1977) (“The probability of the President of the United States committing an 
act of treason against his country is very slight . . . .” (quoting James Iredell in PAMPHLETS 
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 351–52 (Paul Ford ed., 1968)). 
70  Jorgensen, supra note 69, at 367. 
21 NEV. L.J. 117 
Fall 2020] PARDONING DOGS 131 
granting pardons before indictment, or conviction, may he not stop inquiry and 
prevent detection? The case of treason ought, at least, to be excepted.71  
However, the framers determined that those concerns were remedied by the 
existence of the impeachment power,72 and that they were outweighed by the 
determination that granting the pardon power to the Executive would result in 
an appropriate, efficient system of pardons.73 
With respect to the examples in Maine and New Jersey, Governors LePage 
and Whitman each made a considered judgment that pardoning Dakota and Ta-
ro, respectively, would have benefits in excess of costs. They each seem to 
have decided that the moral weight of the dogs’ interest in life was sufficiently 
strong to outweigh the costs of their continued presence. In the case of Taro, it 
is possible that the public outrage and media involvement swayed Governor 
Whitman, yet she still decided that Taro should live, even if there was a risk 
that he might attack again. Even if a judge or legislature might weigh those 
considerations differently, the underlying presupposition of the pardon power 
(and the power to remit a forfeiture) is that the President or Governor is better 
placed to engage in that balancing process and get to the best overall result.  
E. Problems with the Pardon Power: Why Pardoning Dogs Might Not Be the 
Best Way to Respond to Euthanization Orders 
It is important to pause here to acknowledge certain problems with the par-
don power broadly, and the potential problems that could arise when using it in 
conjunction with the pardon of a nonhuman animal. First, some scholars be-
lieve that the use of the pardon power means that something went wrong in the 
criminal justice system: “the person convicted was not actually guilty, or he or 
she was punished too harshly, or the punishment no longer fits the crime.”74 
Thus, the use of a pardon means the system has failed in some way. This con-
cern is also reflected in earlier origins of the pardon power. Historically, mon-
archs would see to it that minor offenses were deemed punishable by death.75 
 
71  3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION 
AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 497 (2d ed. 1836). 
72  Id. at 498. 
73  A delegate explained that it was better to have the power in the hands of the executive 
because “[a] legislative body is utterly unfit for the purpose. They are governed too much by 
the passions of the moment. In Massachusetts, one assembly would have hung all the insur-
gents in that state: the next was equally disposed to pardon them all.” Id. at 519.; see also 
Kristen H. Fowler, Limiting the Federal Pardon Power, 83 IND. L.J. 1651, 1669 (2008). 
74  Chad Flanders, Pardons and the Theory of the “Second-Best,” 65 FLA. L. REV. 1559, 
1559 (2013) (describing pardons as a “safety valve”); see also James P. Goodrich, Use and 
Abuse of the Power to Pardon, 11 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 334, 335 (1921) (“The exer-
cise of clemency by the executive through pardon, parole or the remission of fine, without 
any appeal or review of his action is intended to be the last resort to correct injustices that 
must arise in the administration of criminal laws, which . . . are fixed and inflexible . . . .”). 
75  See Duker, supra note 69, at 476–77.  
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Then, when the monarch used his or her power to pardon a person convicted of 
such an offense, he or she received adulation for being so kind, generous, and 
forgiving.76 This seems to be more a manipulation of the criminal justice sys-
tem than a way to impart mercy and forgiveness.77 
Further, the pardon power is often not applied fairly or with an even hand; 
this is a problem that is connected to racial bias and disparities in criminal pun-
ishment and incarceration more broadly.78 As one commentator noted, 
“[p]ardons can all too often reflect patterns of racial bias, favoritism, and sheer 
randomness, both when they are given too generously and when they are not 
given generously enough.”79 For example, Mississippi’s Governor, Haley Bar-
bour, issued two-thirds of his pardons to white, well-connected prisoners, alt-
hough two-thirds of people in the state who are convicted of crimes are African 
American.80 Similarly, the former Governor of Kentucky recently pardoned a 
number of low-level drug offenders; however, subsequent investigation re-
vealed that they were mostly white.81 This critique leads some to argue that 
governors should hesitate before using the pardon power.82 
 
76  See id. at 476–78 (describing kings in the Middle Ages using pardons because the pun-
ishments for small crimes were harsh and in order to enrich themselves). 
77  This, of course, is not the only explanation. If the justification for punishment is anything 
other than retribution, then pardons could be understood not as a manipulation of the crimi-
nal justice system, but as a fair application of state violence. For example, if a defendant is 
found guilty of a crime, but there are important mitigating circumstances, a jury might nulli-
fy. It is also possible that the guilty verdict itself accomplishes desired punitive functions: 
deterring future wrongdoing because people are now on notice; sending an expressive mes-
sage that the conduct is bad; or aiding in rehabilitation if the criminal process helps the de-
fendant appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct and the magnitude of the harm done. 
The verdict itself might also carry with it stigma and collateral consequences. Thus, tradi-
tional punitive ends would be served, and further punishment might be both unnecessary and 
unjustified. Thanks to Ben Levin for this insight.  
78  Although a discussion of this important issue is beyond the scope of this Article, for an 
overview of racial disparities in incarceration, see generally, Alfred Blumstein, On the Ra-
cial Disproportionality of United States’ Prison Populations, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1259 (1982); Scott Christianson, Legal Implications of Racially Disproportionate Incarcera-
tion Rates, 16 CRIM. L. BULL. 59 (1980); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT 
FORMED THE MOVEMENT 276–77 (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); Jamie Fellner, 
Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement in the United States, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 257, 
260–61 (2009); Ryan D. King & Michael T. Light, Have Racial and Ethnic Disparities in 
Sentencing Declined?, 48 CRIME & JUST. 365 (2019); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and 
Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
1271, 1273 (2004). 
79  Flanders, supra note 74, at 1559. 
80  Id. at 1561; Campbell Robertson & Stephanie Saul, List of Pardons Included Many Tied 
to Power, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/us/many-
pardon-applicants-stressed-connection-to-mississippi-governor.html [https://perma.cc/LCB6 
-KU6M]. 
81  Matt Mencarini & Jonathan Bullington, Matt Bevin Granted Commutations to 336 Ken-
tucky Drug Offenders. Nearly All Were White, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Jan. 9, 2020, 8:52 
AM), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/crime/2019/12/20/bevin-commutations-
nearly-all-drug-offenders-released-were-white/2677651001/ [https://perma.cc/YW9Y-2BL 
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This ties into concerns shared by some commentators that the pardon pow-
er can easily be abused, due in part to the “potential for arbitrary decision-
making that inheres in the unfettered clemency power.”83 In the Maine example 
examined in this Article, Dakota the dog was from the town where Governor 
LePage used to be the Mayor.84 It is possible that he was friendly with some of 
the people involved in her story and wanted to remain in their favor. Or perhaps 
they were donors. It is also possible that LePage sought public accolades and 
positive headlines for his pardoning of this dog, hoping that it would distract 
from the fact that many humans, whom he had not pardoned, remained in pris-
on.85 
This dovetails with specific concerns that might arise from using the par-
don power to pardon a dog. First is a potential apprehension that some might 
have with using the terminology and legal apparatus of criminal law pardons to 
achieve that result for nonhuman animals. Some might fear that this will create 
perverse effects with regard to incarcerated humans, downplaying real prob-
lems with the criminal justice system. Similarly, perhaps the gubernatorial use 
of the power to free a nonhuman animal cheapens the power, suggesting that it 
is not in fact a serious power, and rather is to be used for photo opportunities.86 
 
9]. 
82  Such an argument implicates a larger debate in criminal policy scholarship about whether 
the best way to address inequality in the criminal system is to level-up or level-down. For 
example, should all defendants be treated as well as privileged, wealthy, white defendants 
often are, or as poorly as poor defendants of color typically are? See generally, Aya Gruber, 
Equal Protection Under the Carceral State, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1337 (2018); Kate Levine, 
How We Prosecute the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 745 (2016); Benjamin Levin, Mens Rea Reform 
and Its Discontents, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 491 (2019). 
83  Coleen E. Klasmeier, Towards a New Understanding of Capital Clemency and Procedur-
al Due Process, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1507, 1535 (1995); See also Kathleen Dean Moore, When 
Mercy Weakens Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 1989), https://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/10/ 
opinion/when-mercy-weakens-justice.html [https://perma.cc/8EC5-L3QA] (“Because par-
dons single people out for special treatment, every pardon is potentially . . . a violation of the 
principle of equal treatment under the law.”). 
84  Paul LePage, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Paul_LePage [https://perma.cc/C2S3-
LGEC]. 
85  In Maine, although Black people make up 1 percent of the state’s population, they repre-
sent 7 percent of the incarcerated population. See Maine Profile, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/ME.html [https://perma.cc/3WPF-SSQZ]. Further, 
LePage gained national notoriety for making statements that were widely viewed as racist. 
See, e.g., Amber Phillips, LePage Doubles Down: ‘The Enemy Right Now’ is ‘People of 




86  See also infra note 97–102 and accompanying text (addressing the pardon of a Thanksgiv-
ing turkey). For example, some readers might find it ironic that President Bush and Governor 
LePage—both of whom implemented punitive policies and were viewed as “tough on 
crime”—are associated with nonhuman animal pardons. See Philip V. McHarris, Why Does 
the Minneapolis Police Department Look Like a Military Unit?, WASH. POST (May 28, 2020, 
3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/05/28/explaining-militarized-poli 
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There could be related unease because pardoning a dog is a “humanizing” act,87 
while there is a long history in the U.S. of dehumanizing (and racializing) those 
who are convicted of crimes.88 Indeed, Professor Dorothy Roberts has asserted 
that the U.S. criminal punishment system functions “to maintain forms of racial 
subordination that originated in the institution of slavery . . . . Criminal pun-
ishment has been instrumental in reinstating the subjugated status of black peo-
ple and preserving a racial capitalist power structure.”89 Seen in this light, it 
seems perverse that a dog might be pardoned while a person is executed. These 
are important and valid concerns.90 
That said, the Article posits that these are not “either/or” considerations. 
One can show concern for the plight and treatment of animals under the law, 
while also condemning human-centered systems of oppression and violence; 
one can tout the benefits that might flow from pardoning dogs while decrying 
the racist structural problems that inhere in the human criminal justice system 
and pardons more broadly.91 Indeed, this Article does not focus on the wisdom 
of the pardon power writ large, nor is it about criminal justice reform more 
broadly.92 Rather, it seeks to concentrate on the role that pardons might play in 
 
ce-response-protesters-after-killing-george-floyd/ [https://perma.cc/KTT9-8WNS]; Associ-
ated Press & Marina Villeneuve, Main Gov. Paul LePage Leaves Obscene Voicemail, Talks 
of Shooting Lawmaker, E. BAY TIMES (Aug. 26, 2016, 11:34 AM), https://eastbaytimes.com/ 
2016/08/26/maine-gov-paul-lepage-leaves-obscene-voicemail-talks-of-shooting-lawmaker/ 
[https://perma.cc/KY7E-KCSZ]. 
87  However, an animal law scholar might argue that the goal is not to humanize the dog, but 
to encourage others to see the inherent value and worth in the dog him or herself, without 
comparing him or her to a human. See, e.g., SUE DONALDSON & WILL KYMLICKA, ZOOPOLIS: 
A POLITICAL THEORY OF ANIMAL RIGHTS 4 (2011) (“The only truly effective protection 
against animal exploitation requires shifting . . . to a moral framework that acknowledges 
animals as the bearers of certain inviolable rights . . . [which] is a natural extension of the 
conception of moral equality underpinning the doctrine of human rights.”). 
88  See Blumstein supra note 78, at 1259 (discussing the racial disparities in incarceration). 
“[W]e animalize or dehumanize certain folks, . . . thereby justifying their violation.” APH KO 
& SYL KO, APHRO-ISM: ESSAYS ON POP CULTURE, FEMINISM, AND BLACK VEGANISM FROM 
TWO SISTERS 45 (2017); see also infra note 96 (discussing the problems with “the dreaded 
comparison” literature, which compares the systems of oppression underlying slavery to 
those underlying modern treatment of certain nonhuman animals). 
89  Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 
(2019). 
90  See Richard A. Posner, Animal Rights, 110 YALE L.J. 527, 535 (2000) (reviewing STEVEN 
M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS (2000)) (“[I]f we fail 
to maintain a bright line between animals and human beings, we may end up by treating hu-
man beings as badly as we treat animals, rather than treating animals as well as we treat (or 
aspire to treat) human beings.”); see also supra note 82 (discussing leveling-up and leveling 
down). 
91  See JUSTIN MARCEAU, BEYOND CAGES: ANIMAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT 97–98 
(2019) (taking issue with the way the animal protection movement has furthered carceral 
goals by pushing for greater criminal penalties for those who abuse animals). 
92  It is worth noting, however, that some emerging criminal justice scholars view the move 
to employ the pardon power as a cause for at least modest celebration, viewing it as a way to 
further decarceration goals in the face of a racially biased system. See generally Rachel E. 
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furthering rights for nonhumans. At base, the goal of this Article is not to argue 
that the pardon power should be used to free a nonhuman animal any time that 
animal has been sentenced to die. Rather, it looks at this issue, as presented by 
the two case studies examined herein, and examines the questions and possibili-
ties that are raised by using the pardon power in this way. And that is the key 
here: not that the pardon power is the most elegant or suitable tool to save a dog 
who has been deemed dangerous, but rather, by using the pardon power to free 
those nonhuman animals, could governors further certain goals of the animal 
protection movement?93 This Article suggests that the answer is yes. As the fi-
nal Part of this Article will address, the law has slowly, and in a variety of dif-
ferent substantive areas, been applying provisions meant for humans to nonhu-
man animals.94 As this continues to happen, it is possible that the public 
perception of those nonhuman animals will shift sufficiently so that they begin 
to occupy a more powerful place within our legal hierarchy. 
II. NONTRADITIONAL PARDONS 
To be sure, there has not been much written about the use of the pardon 
power as it relates to nonhuman animals, because pardons aren’t typically used 
to free nonhuman animals.95 However, as this Article has discussed, at least two 
governors have wielded their pardon power in this way. Further, there are other 
examples of “nontraditional pardons,” including the pardoning of the Thanks-
 
Barkow & Mark Osler, Restructuring Clemency: The Cost of Ignoring Clemency and a Plan 
for Renewal, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2015). See also Cortney Lollar, Criminal Justice System 
Is Often Flawed. The Pardon Power Provides a Much-Needed Check, LEXINGTON HERALD 
LEADER (Dec. 16, 2019, 5:05 PM), https://www.kentucky.com/opinion/op-ed/article2384214 
73.html [https://perma.cc/X8Z9-DNF9] (“[T]hough I may doubt the wisdom of several of 
the pardons or commutations Bevin granted, I fully support the governor’s pardon power. 
We have a deeply flawed system. Innocent people are wrongfully convicted. People of lesser 
means go to jail for behavior committed equally often by those with money and power who 
remain unencumbered by the shackles of the criminal system. Racial disparities in arrests, 
charging decisions, and punishment are well-documented and pervasive . . . . Mercy in the 
form of pardons and commutations can correct some of these injustices, right some of these 
imbalances. The criminal legal process needs this check.”). 
93  See infra Section IV.B (describing the expressive function of pardoning dogs). 
94  See infra Section IV.B. 
95  Of note, pardons for all defendants, humans included, are extremely rare. In modern 
times, pardons are rarely used, even by executives who purport to critique the harshness of 
the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Designed to Fail: 
The President’s Deference to the Department of Justice in Advancing Criminal Justice Re-
form, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 387, 425 (2017) (“While President Obama’s [clemency] 
grants were laudable, it is also important to note that he denied nearly twice as many peti-
tions as at least the past five Presidents combined.”); Dafna Linzer, Obama Has Granted 
Clemency More Rarely than Any Modern President, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 2, 2012, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/obama-has-granted-clemency-more-rarely-than-any-mod 
ern-president [https://perma.cc/VB3L-V37K]; Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Adminis-
trative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1348 (2008) (“At both the 
state and federal level, grants of executive clemency have plummeted in recent decades.”); 
Barkow & Osler, supra note 92, at 1. 
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giving turkey, symbolic pardons, mass pardons, and posthumous pardons, 
which are worth discussing.96 
 
96  Another historical example that some readers might find relevant to this discussion is the 
pardoning of enslaved people. See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The 
“Law Only As an Enemy”: The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Coloni-
al and Antebellum Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REV. 969, 987 (1992) (“[A] jailed 
[enslaved person] who had been condemned to die . . . was recommended for a pardon . . . . ” 
(citing ARTHUR P. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 310 n.65 (1930))); George 
Lardner, Jr. & Margaret Colgate Love, Mandatory Sentences and Presidential Mercy: The 
Role of Judges in Pardon Cases, 1790-1850, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 212, 214 (2004) (noting 
that, after an enslaved man was convicted and sentenced to be hanged in 1805, “[f]ive prom-
inent Alexandria lawyers, joined by the clerk of the court, asked for a pardon, saying the ev-
idence had been ‘barely sufficient’ to justify a guilty verdict, much less a death sentence” 
and that President “Jefferson jotted a note at the bottom of the petition, directing the State 
Department to ‘let a pardon issue’ ”); see also id. at 220 n.28 (“Some years later, when Pres-
ident Tyler was asked to commute another [enslaved person’s] prison sentence, he asked his 
Attorney General whether [an enslaved person] could properly be imprisoned since he was 
someone else’s property. Attorney General Nelson responded that the law made no distinc-
tion between [enslaved] and free, and that [an enslaved person] could also be pardoned. The 
President ordered the [enslaved person’s] release to his owner. . . . (pardon of [enslaved per-
son] named Pleasant, aka Daniel Jenkins, on condition of transportation from the District).” 
(citations omitted)); see also Angela P. Harris, Compassion and Critique, 1 COLUM. J. RACE 
& L. 326, 344–45 (2012) (“Slaves were not governed solely as things, of course; they could 
be prosecuted and punished for crimes. Moreover, some states imposed duties on owners not 
to abuse their slaves . . . . But these protections were not couched as individual rights belong-
ing to the slave; they were reflections of the view that slaves, like children, were vulnerable, 
helpless, and incompetent, requiring the master’s protection and control.”). I want to be care-
ful to situate this example and its relevance here. Often referred to as “the dreaded compari-
son,” there is a body of literature that discusses the property status of nonhuman animals in 
comparison to the property status of formerly enslaved people. See MARJORIE SPIEGEL, THE 
DREADED COMPARISON: HUMAN AND ANIMAL SLAVERY (1988). This literature looks at the 
comparative roles of subordination, oppression, exploitation and violence, as well as the 
property status of the victims (rather than equating the history of slavery with the current 
treatment of animals, or suggesting commensurate suffering or moral wrong). See, e.g., Mar-
ya Torrez, Combatting Reproductive Oppression: Why Reproductive Justice Cannot Stop at 
the Species Border, 20 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 265, 269 (2014) (“Most feminists now rec-
ognize that oppressions are interrelated and that oppression is experienced as a result of and 
through any number of intersecting identities.”). But even this type of comparison has the 
potential to be problematic. See Angela P. Harris, Should People of Color Support Animal 
Rights?, 5 J. ANIMAL L. 15, 17 (2009) (“The version of animal rights that people of color 
ought to support is rooted in a deep understanding of the linkages between all forms of sub-
ordination. Racism and what is sometimes called ‘species-ism’ have a common origin and a 
common logic. And opposition to racism should lead one to oppose species-ism as well. The 
relationship between these two -isms, however, is far from [simple].”). As Professor Harris 
noted, it “implicitly constructs a gaze under which slaves and animals appear alike.” Id. at 
26. She continues, “what’s wrong with the analogy is that it ignores the history . . . . [I]t is 
tone-deaf in a way that covertly exploits the very racism that animal liberationists claim to 
reject. Precisely because of the close relationship between colored people and animals in the 
white imagination, the invocation of the dreaded comparison—the chained slave next to the 
chained animal in a sinister visual rhyme—itself calls out the structures of feeling that have 
undergirded racism for so long.” Id. at 25–26; see also Andrea Freeman, Address at Associa-
tion of American Law Schools 2019 Annual Meeting (Jan. 4, 2019) (discussing the problems 
with “the dreaded comparison,” and ways that it can be discussed with more nuance). Simi-
larly, Professor Cassandra Newby-Alexander stated, “You can’t compare the systematic dep-
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Perhaps the most famous example of the pardon of a nonhuman animal is 
the symbolic turkey pardoning at Thanksgiving. The reason that this pardon is 
symbolic is because the turkey has done nothing wrong—other than, perhaps, 
being born into a world where people view turkeys as food rather than as be-
ings entitled to the right to be free from harm and oppression. However, when 
addressing the pardoning of nonhuman animals, the turkey is probably what 
first comes to mind for many people. Presidents going back to George H.W. 
Bush, and—in a less formal way—even earlier, have symbolically “pardoned” 
a turkey or two each Thanksgiving.97 Some credit President Lincoln with the 
tradition, going back to 1863 when a White House reporter “noted, ‘a live tur-
key had been brought home for the Christmas dinner, but [Lincoln’s son Tad] 
interceded in behalf of its life. . . . [Tad’s] plea was admitted and the turkey’s 
life spared.’”98 But President Bush, the elder, began the tradition as we know it 
today, stating of the bird, “[h]e’s granted a presidential pardon as of right 
now—and allow him to live out his days on a children’s farm not far from 
here.”99 Presidents make a show of the fact that the lives of these particular 
 
rivation of people’s rights, their culture and heritage to animals that don’t have an under-
standing of things. Doing so belittles the legacy and horrors of slavery.” Angela P. Harris, 
Should People of Color Support Animal Rights?, 5 J. ANIMAL L. 15, 20–21 (2009) (quoting 
Amecia Taylor, Campaign Equating the Treatment of Animals and Slaves Is Halted, NNPA 
(Aug. 29, 2005), https://web.archive.org/web/20171125051545/https://news.newamericamed 
ia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=2d0b9436b761aae71f5d8a45d62a4690 [https://per 
ma.cc/3GFD-L4MN]). Thus, scholars must acknowledge these concerns and avoid these 
types of comparisons. See Maneesha Deckha, Animal Justice, Cultural Justice: A Posthu-
manist Response to Cultural Rights in Animals, 2 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 189, 196 (2007) 
(discussing “how difficult it is to elicit a recognition of comparable animal suffering from 
marginalized humans who have inculcated an anthropocentric order because they fear (for 
good reasons) being compared, and thus demoted, to the status of ‘mere’ animals.”). Cf. 
MARJORIE SPIEGEL, THE DREADED COMPARISON: HUMAN AND ANIMAL SLAVERY 25 (1988) 
(“Those who are offended by comparison to a fellow sufferer have fallen for the propaganda 
spewed forth by the oppressors. To deny our similarities to animals is to deny and undermine 
our own power. It is to continue actively struggling to prove to our oppressors, past or pre-
sent, that we are similar to our oppressors, rather than those whom our oppressors have also 
victimized. It is to say that we would rather be more like those who have victimized us, ra-
ther than like those who have also been victims.” (emphasis omitted)). But see Tucker Cul-
bertson, Animal Equality, Human Dominion and Fundamental Interdependence, 5 J. ANIMAL 
L. 33, 37 (2009) (“analogies among subordinated groups perpetuate the homogenizing essen-
tialism of subordinating ideologies, thereby failing to apprehend and intervene against the 
intersectional multidimensionality of subordinating practices”). 
97  Ronald G. Shafer, Presidents Didn’t Always Pardon Turkeys. Some Birds Became Dinner. 
WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2018/11/2 
0/presidents-didnt-always-pardon-turkeys-some-became-dinner/ [https://perma.cc/GR7P-DB 
EP]. 
98  See Which President Started the Tradition of Pardoning the Thanksgiving Turkey?, THE 
WHITE HOUSE HIST. ASS’N, https://www.whitehousehistory.org/questions/which-president-st 
arted-the-tradition-of-pardoning-the-thanksgiving-turkey [https://perma.cc/6B8H-YV9S]. 
99  Kenzie Bryant & Jordan Amchin, The Long, Absurd History of Presidential Turkey Par-
donings, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.vanityfair.com/style/photos/2018/11/do 
nald-trump-presidential-turkey-pardoning-photos-history [https://perma.cc/7L83-7DQY]. 
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birds will be spared, and rather than being eaten for Thanksgiving, they will be 
able to live full lives.100 This, however, is a bit disingenuous; because the par-
doned turkeys are bred to be eaten, they have short lifespans, and thus likely 
will not live more than a few years after the reprieve.101 Further, despite the 
“pardon” of these lucky birds, approximately forty-five million turkeys are 
killed for food each year.102 
It is possible that Governor LePage got the idea for Dakota’s pardon from 
the turkey pardoning. Indeed, a press release from the Governor’s office stated, 
“[a]s the President of the United States pardons a turkey every November, 
Governor Paul R. LePage today announced a pardon in an effort to shed light 
on the case of Dakota the Dog.”103 Indeed, one could argue that LePage was us-
ing the term and concept of pardon symbolically in Dakota’s case, and was in-
stead asserting his executive authority—which he views as being quite broad—
by declining to enforce a judgment.104 However, unlike the turkeys, Dakota was 
sentenced to die because she inflicted harm upon another dog, and thus her case 
is less pure symbolism, and more akin to a scenario where a criminal is pun-
ished after having committed a crime. 
Recently, mass pardons have been in the news. For example, the Demo-
cratic Governor of Illinois recently pardoned over 11,000 individuals who were 
guilty of low-level marijuana offenses in advance of a new marijuana legaliza-
tion law in that state.105 The expungements are part of that new law, and are in-
tended to “repair some of the damage caused by efforts to combat sale and use 
 
100  Stepping back, it might strike the reader as odd that our society pardons turkeys and exe-
cutes people, but this rests in large part on the dehumanization of prisoners—especially non-
white prisoners—as well as the humanization of turkeys (and dogs). See generally Akwasi 
Owusu-Bempah, Race and Policing in Historical Context: Dehumanization and the Policing 
of Black People in the 21st Century, 21 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 23, 24, 28 (2017); 
DAVID LIVINGSTONE SMITH, LESS THAN HUMAN: WHY WE DEMEAN, ENSLAVE, AND 
EXTERMINATE OTHERS 2 (2011). 
101  “[A] pardoned bird will be lucky to live two years after it’s saved by the President.” NCC 
Staff, The Real Story Behind the Presidential Turkey Pardon, NAT’L CONST. CTR.: CONST. 
DAILY (Nov. 27, 2019), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-real-story-behind-the-presiden 
tial-turkey-pardon [https://perma.cc/BCZ6-2NDF].  
102  Shafer, supra note 97. 
103  Press Release, Office of Governor Paul R. LePage, Governor LePage Advocates for Life 
of Dakota the Dog (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.maine.gov/governor/lepage/newsroom/artic 
le.html?id=735322 [https://perma.cc/7NK2-GVFW]. 
104  See, e.g., Justin Walker, What Will Guard the Guardians?: Combating Threats to an In-
dependent Judiciary Through Lessons Learned from Theories of Inherent Executive Power, 
85 U. CIN. L. REV. 923, 932 (2018) (explaining that unitary executive theorists have pointed 
to things that the President can do that Congress cannot—such as issue pardons—as illustra-
tive of the singular power of the President, rather than of intended separation of powers). 
105  Associated Press in Chicago, Illinois Governor Pardons 11,000 for Low-Level Marijuana 
Convictions, GUARDIAN (Dec. 31, 2019, 4:25 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/20 
19/dec/31/illinois-governor-jb-pritzker-pardons-11000-marijuana-convictions [https://perma. 
cc/TT3H-UWEM]. 
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of the drug, particularly in minority communities.”106 Indeed, people of color 
are much more likely to be the targets of drug law enforcement, and to receive 
longer sentences, than white people.107 In another perhaps less lauded example, 
the Governor of Kentucky commuted the sentences of a number of individuals, 
including 336 who had been sentenced for drug possession, on his last day of-
fice.108 However, approximately 95 percent of them were white, although peo-
ple of color made up 20 percent of the prison population being held on a prima-
ry charge of drug possession.109 At the federal level, Presidential candidate 
Andrew Yang recently stated, “I’m going to mass pardon everyone who is in 
jail for nonviolent marijuana-related offenses.”110 Many applaud this sweeping 
use of the pardon power.111 Indeed, the pardon power has been called “one of 
the most effective tools for reducing mass incarceration.”112 And if our justice 
system is a tool of oppression and systemic violence, as many have argued,113 
 
106  Id. 
107  See, e.g., Benjamin Mueller et al., Surest Way to Face Marijuana Charges in New York: 
Be Black or Hispanic, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/13/ny 
region/marijuana-arrests-nyc-race.html [https://perma.cc/8Y7W-N4S5] (noting that, across 
New York City, “black people were arrested on low-level marijuana charges at eight times 
the rate of white, non-Hispanic people over the past three years”). “[A]mong neighborhoods 
where people called about marijuana at the same rate, the police almost always made arrests 
at a higher rate in the area with more black residents.” Id.; see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 
DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN SENTENCING: AN UPDATE TO THE 2012 BOOKER REPORT 
(2017) (noting that “Black male offenders received sentences on average 19.1 percent longer 
than similarly situated White male offenders”). 
108  These pardons received media attention in part because they included those who were 
convicted of child rape and murder. See Andrew Wolfson & Joe Sonka, Bevin Pardons In-
clude Convicted Killer Whose Brother Hosted Campaign Fundraiser for Him, LOUISVILLE 
COURIER J. (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/politics/2019/12/11 
/bevin-issued-hundreds-pardons-and-commutations-final-day/4399770002/ [https://perma.cc 
/AT9J-5EFB]. 
109  Mencarini & Bullington, supra note 81. 
110  Brooke Seipel, Andrew Yang Promises Mass Pardon to Those Imprisoned for Nonviolent 
Marijuana Offenses, THE HILL (Aug. 17, 2019, 2:03 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/cam 
paign/457821-andrew-yang-promises-mass-pardon-to-those-imprisoned-for-nonviolent [http 
s://perma.cc/V3MX-7LUU]. 
111  Barkow & Osler, supra note 92, at 4; see, e.g., Cortney E. Lollar, Opinion: Pardons 
Show Matt Bevin’s Compassion. These People Are More Than Their Crimes, LOUISVILLE 
COURIER J. (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/opinion/opinion-pardons-
show-matt-bevin-s-compassion-these-people-are-more-than-their-crimes/ar-BBY3aRS?ocid 
=msn360 [https://perma.cc/X8P5-CMAZ].  
112  Matt Ford, Why Aren’t Democratic Governors Pardoning More Prisoners?, NEW 
REPUBLIC (Jan. 4, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/152847/arent-democratic-governor 
s-pardoning-prisoners [https://perma.cc/LP7W-7K7R]. 
113  See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); Radley Balko, The Case for Releasing Violent Offenders, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2017, 8:23 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/w 
p/2017/08/14/the-case-for-releasing-violent-offenders/ [https://perma.cc/SSP3-AHK4] (“We 
want to punish criminals. We want them to suffer. We create hostile prison environments rife 
with violence, racial resentment and rape.”). 
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then the pardon is a way of responding to a fundamentally unjust system. Using 
the pardon power in this way certainly advances public policy goals, including 
decarceration. However, some might view the use of the pardon power en 
masse to be an abuse of power, violative of separation-of-powers principles, or 
failing to further the typical aims of the pardon power. But the Supreme Court 
has upheld these categorical pardons, explaining that the Executive can pardon 
“by classes, conditionally or absolutely.”114 And mass, categorical pardons can 
also advance standard goals of pardons, including mercy, forgiveness, equity, 
and adaptation.115 Although these determinations are being made on a large, ra-
ther than individualized, scale, the goal of the chief executive’s action is to 
adapt to changes in laws and morality, and forgive the violation of laws that are 
perhaps no longer thought to be valid or current. 
Thus, some might argue that if a governor or citizen does not want danger-
ous dogs to be euthanized, they should work with the legislature to change the 
dangerous dog statute, or to change the status of animals within the state from 
property to something more substantial. However, it is no secret that legislative 
change is often difficult. Thus, if a governor that believes that the property sta-
tus of animals is not appropriate, he or she might instead decide to issue a mass 
pardon for all animals being held, seeking to further public policy goals while 
also showing mercy to those animals and forgiving them for any wrongful acts 
they may have committed. 
Another example of an odd pardon is the posthumous pardon.116 The idea 
that mercy animates the pardon power does not square with the idea of a post-
humous pardon; there can be no mercy for the dead person, who has already 
been punished without reprieve. And while it is possible to forgive a person 
who has died, that forgiveness has more of an impact on others—for example, 
the dead person’s family or friends—than on the person him or herself. Further, 
 
114  Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925) (citing Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380 
(1866)); see Markowitz & Nash, supra note 40, at 99 (“The Court has explained that broad 
pardons, or ‘amnesties,’ are simply a permissible extension of the President’s power to par-
don an individual.”). 
115  See Markowitz & Nash, supra note 40, at 106 (“Presidents have, for centuries, issued 
categorical pardons [as a use of] their inherent power of mercy and duty to promote the na-
tional interest to alleviate the toll of harsh laws on politically unpopular groups.”). 
116  The first Presidential posthumous pardon was issued by President Clinton in 1999 for Lt. 
Henry Ossian Flipper. Darryl W. Jackson et. al., Bending Toward Justice: The Posthumous 
Pardon of Lieutenant Henry Ossian Flipper, 74 IND. L.J. 1251, 1251, 1277 (1999) (recogniz-
ing that, at the time of the writing, nine states had granted posthumous pardons). “[L]awyers 
for the Flipper family noted that the stigma of Lt. Flipper’s conviction had discouraged in-
clusion of his statute in a ‘Walk of History’ under consideration by the City of El 
Paso . . . They urged that pardon be granted to remove ‘the unjust blot upon his outstanding 
reputation and character,’ for ‘Lieutenant Flipper and his descendants, for the good of the 
military justice system, and for the good of our country . . . .’ ” Margaret Colgate Love, Of 
Pardons, Politics and Collar Buttons: Reflections on the President’s Duty to Be Merciful, 27 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483, 1498–99 n.55 (2000) (citing Darryl W. Jackson et al., Bending 
Toward Justice: The Posthumous Pardon of Lieutenant Henry Ossian Flipper, 74 IND. L.J. 
1251, 1291 (1999)). 
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although the person to be pardoned was a human, it is not clear that they are 
still a “person” in the traditional or legal sense of the word.117 In this way, the 
pardon of a person who has died is similar to the pardon of a nonhuman animal: 
both beings exist somewhere on a spectrum between person and thing, unable 
to own property of their own,118 but something more than a mere inanimate ob-
ject. 
Moreover, both a posthumous pardon and the pardon of a nonhuman ani-
mal serve an expressive function.119 For example, the former Governor of New 
York, George Pataki, issued a posthumous pardon to the comedian Lenny 
Bruce in 2003, thirty-nine years after his conviction for using obscenity during 
a standup comedy act.120 In issuing the state’s first posthumous pardon, the 
Governor said it was “a declaration of New York’s commitment to upholding 
the First Amendment” and that the pardon was to “serve[] as a reminder of the 
precious freedoms we are fighting to preserve.”121 Thus, the pardon served not 
to aid Bruce or his relatives, but to express a commitment to the First Amend-
ment (or at least to give the appearance of such a commitment). 
More recently, President Trump pardoned a former heavyweight boxing 
champion, Jack Johnson.122 Johnson was convicted in 1913 under the Mann Act 
for transporting a white woman across state lines (Johnson was Black).123 Of 
note, President Obama failed to issue a pardon to Johnson, though there had 
been a congressional resolution calling for his pardon during Obama’s presi-
 
117  See Ellen Stroud, Law and the Dead Body: Is a Corpse a Person or a Thing?, 14 ANN. 
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 115, 115 (2018) (“The central puzzle of the law of the dead is that a 
corpse is both a person and a thing.”); Brian Morris, You've Got to Be Kidneying Me! The 
Fatal Problem of Severing Rights and Remedies from the Body of Organ Donation Law, 74 
BROOK. L. REV. 543, 548 (2009) (noting that courts recognize “a ‘quasi-property right’ in a 
corpse where the corpse was negligently mishandled or defaced.”). 
118  Haynes’s Case (1614), 12 Co. Rep. 113, 77 E.R. 1389 (a corpse cannot own anything). 
But see Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Stanley, No. 152736/15, 2015 N.Y. 
Misc. LEXIS 2816, at *29–32 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 29, 2015) (In a case about extending ha-
beas rights to chimpanzees, the Court stated, “ ‘Legal personhood’ is not necessarily synon-
ymous with being human . . . . Not very long ago, only caucasian male, property-owning cit-
izens were entitled to the full panoply of legal rights under the United States Constitution.”).  
119  Infra Section IV.B (discussing the expressive function of law). On the related topic of 
posthumous exoneration, see, e.g., Samuel Wiseman, Innocence After Death, 60 CASE W. 
RSRV. L. REV. 687, 687 (2010) (“The exoneration of a deceased defendant may appear, at 
first glance, to be a mostly empty gesture . . . . The posthumous exoneration has an essential 
corrective justice function, however, for individuals, communities, and societies. At the indi-
vidual level, posthumous exonerations . . . ensure belated justice.” (citation omitted)). 
120  John Kifner, No Joke! 37 Years After Death Lenny Bruce Receives Pardon, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 24, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/24/nyregion/no-joke-37-years-after-deat 
h-lenny-bruce-receives-pardon.html [https://perma.cc/S7X6-99GD].  
121  Id. 
122  John Eligon & Michael D. Shear, Trump Pardons Jack Johnson, Heavyweight Boxing 
Champion, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/sports/jack-
johnson-pardon-trump.html [https://perma.cc/J3U3-4C8M]. 
123  Id.  
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dency.124 Apparently, the Obama Justice Department recommended against is-
suing a pardon “because it was their policy to focus on grants of clemency that 
could still have a positive effect on people who are still living.”125 Occasional-
ly, for example, certain survivor benefits might be conditioned on the criminal 
status of a deceased spouse,126 but that was not the case with Johnson. And 
while Johnson himself felt no positive effects from the pardon, it is possible 
that his family did. Linda Haywood, who was related to Johnson, said that she 
was appreciative for the pardon, stating that her “family can go forward know-
ing the pain and the shame has been replaced.”127 Above all else, however, the 
pardon serves an expressive function—recognizing that the conviction was ra-
cially motivated and unjust—and could open the door to preventing similar fu-
ture injustices carried out by racial animus within the police force or the crimi-
nal justice system more broadly.128 Similarly, the pardon of nonhuman animals 
could serve the expressive function of recognizing that dogs have feelings and 
emotions, and that they are worthy of mercy, forgiveness, and moral considera-
tion.129 
III. NONHUMAN ANIMALS AND THE COURTS 
A. A Long History of Animal Trials  
Although the idea of pardoning a dog might seem preposterous to some, 
animals have received pardons since ancient times.130 And more than that, put-
 
124  Id.  
125  Id.; See also Barkow & Osler, supra note 95, at 425–26; Linzer, supra note 95; Barkow, 
supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing President Obama’s use of the pardon pow-
er). 
126  See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. §§ 6101–08 (deductions and cancellation of benefits for veterans and 
sometimes their spouses and dependents when certain crimes are committed by the veteran). 
127  Eligon & Shear, supra note 122. 
128  Jessica R. Pliley, A Pardon Arrives 105 Years Too Late, ATLANTIC (May 30, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/05/a-pardon-arrives-105-years-too-late/5614 
07/ [https://perma.cc/JU3K-EYEN]; see Christopher Man & Jacob Laksin, Applying the 
Presidential Pardon Power in the Context of an Investigation of the Executive Branch, 33 
CRIM. JUST. 12, 14–15 (2018) (“As well as giving justice to individuals who had been denied 
it in their lifetimes, the posthumous pardons reinforced the Supreme Court’s view . . . that a 
pardon need not be accepted to be valid . . . .”). 
129  See infra Section IV.B. See generally Sunstein, supra note 26 (noting that the expressive 
function of a law can lead to a shift in social norms, which may then influence the creation 
of new or different laws); see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian Copy-
right, 118 YALE L.J. 1126, 1148 (2009) (reviewing NEIL W. NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S 
PARADOX (2008)) (describing the expressive function as “the notion that law plays a role in 
symbolically reinforcing certain values, independent of its ability to regulate behavior linked 
to those values.”). 
130  Paul Schiff Berman, Note, Rats, Pigs and Statues on Trial: The Creation of Cultural 
Narratives in the Prosecution of Animals and Inanimate Objects, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 288, 
301 (1994) (Historically, “[a]s with human beings, animals also could receive a pardon prior 
to punishment.”). 
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ting animals on trial and punishing them by death was historically quite com-
mon.131 Although much of this history is quite old, animal prosecutions were 
reported as late as 1916 in Kentucky and Tennessee.132 
According to Professor Jen Girgen, medieval trials of animals fell into one 
of two categories: (1) ecclesiastical courts considered animals who caused a 
public nuisance, as well as groups of wild animals; and (2) secular courts con-
sidered the cases of animals who caused physical harm or death to a person, 
and transgressions by domesticated animals.133 Accused animals were provided 
with a public defender, paid for by the community; trials involved witnesses 
and evidence; the accused often spent time in human jail cells; and if they were 
executed, the action was undertaken by a professional hangman.134 
Although the animals were usually found guilty and executed, on occasion 
the secular judges found in favor of the animal.135 Further, upon a conviction, 
the animal’s lawyer might appeal, which would on occasion result in a lighter 
verdict. For example, Girgen describes a case where a pig and a donkey had 
been sentenced to hang, but after an appeal and a new trial, they “were each re-
sentenced ‘to be simply knocked on the head.’ ”136 If the animal were executed, 
it was typically buried alongside executed human criminals.137 
Sometimes, though, the animals were pardoned. One commentator de-
scribes a situation where two herds of pigs were sentenced as accomplices after 
three of their number killed a boy.138 Although the majority of the pigs did not 
directly take part in the killing, they were deemed accomplices because they 
“had hastened to the scene of the murder and by their cries and aggressive ac-
tions showed that they approved of the assault, and were ready and even eager 
to become participes criminis.”139 In this instance, the Duke of Burgundy is-
 
131  Jen Girgen, The Historical and Contemporary Prosecution and Punishment of Animals, 9 
ANIMAL L. REV. 97, 98 (2003) (noting that “animal trials and executions . . . were a regular 
part of our Western jurisprudential history.”). 
132  Id. at 122. For a discussion of other animal prosecutions, see also E.P. EVANS, THE 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF ANIMALS 332–34 (1906) (noting that 
there were prosecutions of animals throughout Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries); Wal-
ter W. Hyde, The Prosecution and Punishment of Animals and Lifeless Things in the Middle 
Ages and Modern Times, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 696, 705–06 (1916); Piers Beirnes, The Law Is 
an Ass: Reading E.P. Evans’ The Medieval Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals, 
2 SOC’Y & ANIMALS 27–44 (1994). 
133  Girgen, supra note 131, at 99. 
134  Id.; EVANS, supra note 131, at 140–42. 
135  Girgen, supra note 131, at 109. 
136  Id. at 110–11 (quoting EVANS, supra note 132, at 140). 
137  Id. at 113. 
138  Sykes, supra note 18, at 306 (recounting the story of the pigs as told in EVANS, supra 
note 129, at 144). 
139  Evans, supra note 132, at 144. 
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sued “a pardon for all the pigs except the three perpetrators.”140 He did this per-
haps in part because one herd was the common property of a village, and it was 
forbidden to eat an animal that had been executed. Therefore, if all the pigs had 
been executed, they would have been valueless and the village would have suf-
fered.141 
Commentators have proposed a number of motivations behind these an-
cient animal trials, including some of the same reasons that we try and convict 
humans: eliminating a social danger, deterring others (human and nonhuman) 
from repeating similar behavior, warning animal guardians that they are re-
sponsible for their animals, denunciation, and even revenge.142 This speaks to 
the fact that criminal law has both emotional underpinnings (including mercy 
and grief), as well as intellectual and expressive aspects (including the message 
that the courts and the government want to communicate). Here, it is useful to 
consider the varied purposes of criminal penalties—including retribution, re-
moval/safety/incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation—in thinking about 
animal trials of old and their more modern analogues.143 Of these purposes, it is 
hard to see how punishing nonhuman animals for their transgressions could 
lead to their rehabilitation or deter their future actions.144 It is possible that ret-
ribution might apply in the context of nonhuman animals—a person who was 
harmed wants payback and for the offender to suffer—though commentators 
generally do not believe that this alone is a good reason for imposing punish-
ment.145 The most common modern reason for killing animals who have been 
deemed dangerous would be removal and safety, as will be discussed in more 
detail below.146 
In the context of human punishment, the goals are multifaceted; if society 
seeks more than just safety and removal, it may sometimes justify harsher pun-
ishments. However, in the context of nonhuman animals, there are fewer rea-
sons to punish the animal and the emotional underpinnings are strong. Because 
 
140  Sykes, supra note 18, at 306. Query whether the pigs who were allowed to live noticed 
that the three perpetrators were no longer present, and whether this might have served a de-
terrent function! 
141  Id.; see Girgen, supra note 131, at 112 (“If the offending animal was particularly valua-
ble . . . a judge might have been more receptive to the defense counsel’s plea to spare her 
life.”). 
142  Girgen, supra note 131, at 118–20; Nicholas Humphrey, Foreword to EVANS, supra note 
132, at vii–viii. 
143  ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 45 (1976). 
144  While ancient animal trials were often about punishing the animal him or herself, it is 
less clear that current day animal trials (and specifically, dangerous dog hearings) serve to 
punish the animal. This will be discussed in more detail infra Section III.B. 
145  Martin R. Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution—An Examination of Doing Justice, 
1976 WIS. L. REV. 781, 784–85. 
146  This parallels similar penological shifts regarding humans. See Malcolm M. Feeley & 
Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its 
Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 458 (1992) (discussing incapacitation as a justification). 
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there will almost universally be a lack of culpability, a merciful response, such 
as a pardon, might make sense. 
B. Modern Day Animal Trials: Dangerous Dog Hearings 
Undergirding the preceding section was the ancient notion that nonhuman 
animals were morally responsible for criminal acts, like murder.147 Humans had 
other misguided notions about criminal justice in those times as well, many of 
which have changed over time. And although formal prosecutions of animals 
before a tribunal is mostly the stuff of the past, in some sense, these animal tri-
als continue today in the form of dangerous dog hearings. Although these hear-
ings often sound in forfeiture, and are really more about protecting the public 
and/or punishing the guardian of the dog,148 the hearings are in some ways 
analogous to prosecutions,149 and even evoke older animal trials.150 
Although the details vary from state to state, generally these proceedings 
begin when a dog bites, mauls, or kills a human or nonhuman animal. “The def-
inition of ‘dangerous dog’ usually refers to an act or actions taken by a dog that 
makes him or her a risk to the public welfare.”151 If it is a first offense, the gov-
ernment might place certain restrictions on the dog. For example, the dog’s 
guardian might have to hang a sign on her home stating that a vicious dog lives 
on the premises, the dog might need to be muzzled when in public, or the dog 
might need to undergo behavioral training.152 If the dog subsequently gets loose 
or attacks again, it might be required to leave the jurisdiction, or be sentenced 
to death.153 Such a determination will follow from a hearing, at which the sins 
 
147  As will be discussed below, new research suggests that some animals do know right from 
wrong and feel emotions like regret when they have acted badly. Whether this equates to the 
commission of a moral wrong will be discussed in more detail below. See infra Section 
IV.A. 
148  “Modern proceedings take place precisely because a dog is someone’s property; an ag-
gressive dog that did not belong to anyone would, of course, be destroyed without any kind 
of hearing.” Sykes, supra note 18, at 303. 
149  Dangerous dog hearings are criminal proceedings in four states. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
9-204.5 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 609.098 (2020); 3 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 459-
502-A (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess. Act 95); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.2-6540 (West, 
Westlaw through end of the 2020 Reg. Sess.). However, it is the guardian who is the crimi-
nal, not the dog. 
150  Girgen, supra note 131, at 122–27. 
151  128 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 3d § 291, Westlaw (database updated July 2020). 
152  See supra text accompanying note 3 (referencing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, which lists 
some of these types of requirements). 
153  Of note, the fact that dangerous dogs are locked up and then, often, sentenced to die sug-
gests that “carceral logic”—where punishment reigns supreme—has reached beyond hu-
mans. The first instinct is often to incarcerate or eliminate anyone who has committed an 
action deemed unfit by society. Rather than work toward reforming the offensive behavior, 
the law has instead decided that a dangerous dog should be killed. This carceral logic is per-
vasive and has been addressed by a number of criminal law and civil rights scholars. See 
Roberts, supra note 89, at 18 (“As carceral logics take over ever-expanding aspects of our 
society, so does the cruelty that government agents visit on people who are the most vulner-
21 NEV. L.J. 117 
146 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:1  
of the animal are on display, along with evidence presented about whether the 
victim had instigated the attack or aggravated the animal.154 
Animal-control and dangerous dog laws are not traditionally viewed as 
“criminal” in nature.155 That said, four states use a criminal proceeding to de-
clare a dog dangerous: Colorado, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Virginia.156 Fur-
ther, in three of those states, “harboring, maintaining, or owning a dangerous 
dog” is a crime.157 After an attack, dog DNA evidence is sometimes collect-
ed.158 Of course, it is not the dog who would be considered the criminal in these 
instances. More commonly, however, these proceedings are administrative or 
civil.159 Indeed, at first glance, dangerous dog hearings often seem to be based 
on forfeiture, abating a nuisance, or other civil wrong. 
The reason the state can order the dog to be put to death is because dogs 
are currently considered property in all fifty states, and the police power affords 
states the right to regulate in furtherance of public health, safety, welfare, and 
morals.160 As the Supreme Court stated over a century ago,  
 
able to state surveillance and confinement.”). See generally Sarah Deer & Abigail Barefoot, 
The Limits of the State: Feminist Perspectives on Carceral Logic, Restorative Justice and 
Sexual Violence, 28 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 505, 505–25 (2019); KITTY CALAVITA & 
VALERIE JENNESS, APPEALING TO JUSTICE: PRISONER GRIEVANCES, RIGHTS, AND CARCERAL 
LOGIC (2015). The treatment of dogs deemed dangerous suggests that this way of thinking 
impacts nonhumans as well. MARCEAU, supra note 91, at 1–2, 21 (2019) (extending carceral 
logic to the animal protection movement). Indeed, thinking about carceral politics more 
broadly, animals are nearly universally caged: in zoos, on farms, in slaughterhouses, in shel-
ters, and even, as we have seen in New Jersey, in jails themselves. The pardon power is one 
method that can be used to target this carceral mindset—both with respect to humans and 
nonhumans. And part of its expressive function might suggest a change in norms that allows 
people to think about reform and rehabilitation before caging and execution. See infra Sec-
tion IV.B (addressing the expressive function of the pardon power). 
154  CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 31621 (Deering, Lexis through 2020 Reg. Sess.). 
155  However, a book about Dangerous Dog laws called A Lawyer’s Guide to Dangerous Dog 
Issues contains a chapter titled, “Prosecuting Dangerous Dog Cases,” which addresses “of-
fending dogs,” “accused dog[s],” “perpetrating dog[s],” “Witnesses for the Prosecution,” 
victim statements, and uses other criminal law terminology. See Michelle Welch, Prosecut-
ing Dangerous Dog Cases, in A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO DANGEROUS DOG ISSUES 39–46 (Joan 
Schaffner ed., 2009). 
156  See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-204.5 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Extraordinary 
Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. § 609.098 (2020); 3 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 459-502-A 
(West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess. Act 95); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.2-6540 (West, 
Westlaw through end of the 2020 Reg. Sess.). 
157  See Charlotte Walden, State Dangerous Dog Laws, MICH. STATE UNIV.: ANIMAL LEGAL 
& HIST. CTR. (2019), https://www.animallaw.info/topic/state-dangerous-dog-laws 
[https://perma.cc/P7WZ-778Y]; see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-204.5 (2012); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 609.098 (2020); 3 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 459-502-A (West, Westlaw 
through 2020 Reg. Sess. Act 95). 
158  Welch, supra note 155, at 42–43 (also noting, “The dog may have the victim’s blood on 
it or a piece of the victim’s clothing in its mouth. State labs may or may not have the re-
sources to analyze the blood on the dog but should do so if necessary.”). 
159  See Walden, supra note 157. 
160  Sentell v. New Orleans, 166 U.S. 698, 702, 703–04 (1897); BRUCE A. WAGMAN ET AL., 
ANIMAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 71 (6th ed. 2019) (“As of the publication of this edi-
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[Dogs] have, from time immemorial, been considered as holding their lives at 
the will of the legislature, and properly falling within the police powers of the 
several states . . . . Even if it were assumed that dogs are property in the fullest 
sense of the word, they would still be subject to the police power of the state, 
and might be destroyed or otherwise dealt with, as in the judgment of the legisla-
ture is necessary for the protection of its citizens. That a state, in a bona fide ex-
ercise of its police power, may interfere with private property, and even order its 
destruction, is as well settled as any legislative power can be which has for its 
objects the welfare and comfort of the citizen.161 
Thus, a dangerous dog determination could result in a forfeiture order, as 
well as destruction of the “property” that has been forfeited. And although that 
is the applicable, technical legal structure given the current property status of 
dogs, they are sometimes treated more like prisoners than property. For exam-
ple, as was mentioned above, Taro was kept in a jail cell in New Jersey and 
given a prisoner number after his dangerous dog determination.162 Thus, dan-
gerous dog hearings and their outcomes can sometimes blur the lines between 
civil and criminal actions in terms of public expectations. 
In analyzing dangerous dog statutes and hearings, and in thinking about 
whether they might be fertile ground for the use of the pardon power, it is in-
structive to consider whom these statutes seek to punish, and whom they seek 
to protect. Although most dangerous dog statutes are not criminal per se, they 
do reflect certain punitive aspects. And, as the Animal Legal Defense Fund 
stated,  
If animals cannot commit crimes, should they be punished in such a severe and 
irreversible manner for triggering a dangerous dog law they are not even aware 
of (but their owners should be)? There is an inherent contradiction in sentencing 
an animal to die—the most severe penalty in our legal system—while at the 
same time claiming she cannot be pardoned because she has not been convicted 
of a crime.163 
Thus, we must examine who these laws are punishing, and why. Some 
might argue that these statutes punish the dogs who are deemed vicious or dan-
gerous themselves—as was often the case with the animal trials of the past. In-
deed, these dogs must either live with restrictions, or be put to death, due to ac-
tions they committed.164 Others might argue that the statutes seek to punish the 
offending dog’s guardian for failing to control the actions of the dog. Under 
 
tion, nonhuman animals are still property under the law of all fifty states, and that status 
seems to be entrenched.”). 
161  Sentell, 166 U.S. at 702, 704. 
162  Ready for a Milk-Bone Last Meal?, supra note 11. 
163  Nicole Pallotta, After Judge Denies Maine Governor’s “Pardon,” Last-Minute Appeal 
Temporarily Saves Dog Sentenced to Death, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND (May 8, 2017), 
https://aldf.org/article/after-judge-denies-maine-governors-pardon-last-minute-appeal-
temporarily-saves-dog-sentenced-to-death/ [https://perma.cc/S787-YCRC]. 
164  For a discussion of dangerous dog laws, see generally Cynthia A. McNeely & Sarah A. 
Lindquist, Dangerous Dog Laws: Failing to Give Man’s Best Friend a Fair Shake at Justice, 
3 J. ANIMAL L. 99 (2007). 
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this analysis, the dog is merely unfortunate collateral damage; he or she is the 
property of the guardian, and the state punishes the guardian by taking away 
their property. For example, consider a scenario where a dog injures or kills 
another, as was the case in Maine where Dakota killed another dog. A person 
might believe that Dakota and/or her guardian should be punished because the 
dog committed harm against another dog as well as against the other guardian 
whose dog was harmed. Reasoning in this way would suggest that Dakota 
committed an offense against a fellow citizen.165 
However, if dangerous dog statutes are really about civil wrongs—about 
forfeiture or nuisance—then the better line of inquiry looks at whom these stat-
utes seek to protect, and considers the broader purpose or instrumental end that 
the legislature was seeking to further by enacting these statutes. In general, 
these statutes exist because the legislature wants dog guardians to be responsi-
ble for their own dogs, and to prevent them from harming others.166 The over-
riding policy goal of these statutes is to protect society—including humans and 
other animals—from potential future harm carried out by a “dangerous dog.” 
Indeed, Maine’s Assistant Attorney General wrote a letter to the Judge who 
was hearing Dakota’s case on behalf of the Department of Agriculture, Conser-
vation and Forestry, which said, “[t]he intent of the dangerous dog statute is to 
protect the public by deterring owners of dangerous dogs from letting them 
loose. It is not intended as a punishment for a dog . . . .”167 Thus, these laws 
seek to control and remove “dangerous dogs” from a community, ostensibly in 
order to protect the community as a whole,168 rather than to punish or protect a 
discrete or particular person or group of persons from harm.169 
Applying the legal rules about the pardon power’s limitations to the world 
of animal law is not straightforward. Here, if dangerous dog statutes really are 
forfeiture statutes, then it is likely more legally appropriate to act as Governor 
Whitman did in remitting the forfeiture of Taro, relying on Taro’s property sta-
tus. However, as will be discussed below, there is an important expressive 
 
165  Thus, it could be argued, this should not be a pardonable offense (at least at the federal 
level) because it is not a crime against the State but against an individual. 
166  For example, in Maine’s most recent amendment to its dangerous dog statute, the legisla-
ture increased or created licensing fees for possession of dangerous dogs, fines for owners 
who failed to abide by the laws about dangerous dogs, and available civil penalties for own-
ers who fail to follow court orders. Comm. on Agric., Conservation, & Forestry, 128th 
Cong., C-A (H-706) to H.P. 607, L.D. 858 (Me. 2018), https://legislature.maine.gov/legis/bil 
ls/getPDF.asp?paper=HP0607&item=2&snum=128 [https://perma.cc/2TU7-ZNUK]. 
167  Letter from Mark A. Randlett, Assistant Att’y Gen., to the Hon. Valerie Stanfill, Maine 
Dist. Ct. J. (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.maine.gov/dacf/about/news/DACF-Dakota.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RB6P-D79T]. 
168  Of note, this mirrors a move in human penology toward a justification of removal and 
safety rather than retributivism. Some criminal law scholars have argued that one way to un-
derstand mass incarceration and current punitive policies is to view incapacitation itself as 
the justification. See Feeley & Simon, supra note 146, at 458.  
169  Thus, one might argue that the violation of such a statute is more akin to a public wrong 
than a private or civil wrong, and so is properly within the purview of the pardon power. 
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function that accompanies the use of the pardon power. Thus, by issuing a “full 
and free pardon” following a dangerous dog hearing, a governor could express 
his or her belief that the dog should not be punished, and that the public can 
still be protected, even if the dog is set free. 
Finally, although this Article is focused primarily on gubernatorial power 
in the aftermath of a dog’s euthanization order, these “death sentences” are 
sometimes commuted through less public and dramatic means by individuals or 
processes other than the governor. Local government entities, including town 
boards, city councils, mayors, or animal control officers might be given this 
power through local ordinances.170 For example, a New York dog named Luna 
was recently declared a dangerous dog under the City of Troy’s local ordi-
nance, which required euthanization after a single bite.171 A state senator from 
the area petitioned Governor Cuomo to take action and pardon the dog (or at 
least the dog’s owner).172 However, before the Governor’s office could act, the 
City reached a settlement with the dog’s guardian that placed the dog on proba-
tion, but did not declare her “dangerous” or require her death.173 Further, the 
case caused the City to modify its dangerous dog ordinance to be more lenient 
in the future.174 While these local actions might not get as much press coverage, 
they can still have the effect of sparing the animal’s life. 
Given all this, some might suggest that perhaps the problem is just the dan-
gerous dog laws themselves. Might it not be easier and less controversial to 
simply seek legislative change, rather than using the pardon power in this po-
tentially unorthodox way? First, legislative change is not always easier than a 
pardon, wherein the chief executive can act unilaterally. And even the best 
dangerous dog laws—which are often set at the city or county level—might 
still need a safety valve and a means of avoiding inconsistent outcomes. Fur-
ther, as the following Part will suggest, the pardon carries with it a powerful 
expressive function, which may lead to a change in norms when the underlying 
laws are slow to change. 
 
170  For example, a “town police department and the mayor’s office were flooded with phone 
calls protesting [a dog named] Prince’s sentence.” Girgen, supra note 131, at 126 (discussing 
a “dangerous dog” in New Hampshire whose life was spared). 
171  Tedisco to Cuomo: Pardon Dog, TIMES UNION (Dec. 13, 2018, 3:53 PM), https://www.ti 
mesunion.com/news/article/Tedisco-asks-Cuomo-to-pardon-Luna-the-dog-13464400.php [ht 
tps://perma.cc/7MFW-ZBQV]. 
172  Id. 
173  Luna the Dog Saved, Prepares to Head Home for the Holidays, SPECTRUM NEWS (Dec. 
18, 2018, 6:34 PM), https://spectrumlocalnews.com/nys/central-ny/news/2018/12/13/effort-
to-save-luna [https://perma.cc/ZWS9-WGUB]. 
174  Id.; see TROY, N.Y. CODE § 124–9 (2006), https://ecode360.com/11131031 [https://perma 
.cc/XG2P-BBVP]. 
21 NEV. L.J. 117 
150 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:1  
IV. THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR APPLYING THE PARDON POWER TO 
NONHUMAN ANIMALS 
Given both the long past and more recent history of subjecting nonhuman 
animals to trial and pardon, it is clear that it can be done. But should it? This 
Part presents two potential reasons that a governor, state, or citizens175 might 
choose to extend the pardon power to nonhuman animals. The first relates to 
the history and motivations behind the pardon power, and the moral status of 
animals. The second relates to the expressive function of the pardon power. 
A. History and Morality, Culpability and Capacity 
As was discussed above, there are many motivations and justifications that 
give force to the pardon power, including mercy, forgiveness, equity, adapta-
tion, common sense, and good public policy.176 Some might view the idea of 
assigning moral weight to animals as anthropomorphic and old-fashioned (after 
all, the animal trials of old existed because people believed animals should be 
punished for their sins).177 And, if animals are not morally responsible for their 
actions, then what is there to forgive? 
While this argument holds some appeal, recent research into animal emo-
tions suggests that animals in fact experience pleasure, pain, anger, hope and 
grief.178 For example, scientists have recently documented practices of grief and 
mourning in species as diverse as dolphins, elephants, and giraffes.179 Some 
scientists also posit that nonhuman animals can feel regret for their actions.180 
 
175  This could be done, for example, through a Constitutional Amendment, popular referen-
dum, or citizens’ initiative. 
176  See supra note 29.  
177  See generally Sykes, supra note 18 (describing Medieval animal trials); see also Girgen, 
supra note 131 and accompanying text; EVANS, supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
178  See, e.g., MARC BEKOFF, MINDING ANIMALS: AWARENESS, EMOTIONS, AND HEART 4 
(2002); Barbara J. King, Animal Mourning: Précis of BARBARA J. KING, HOW ANIMALS 
GRIEVE (2013), 4 ANIMAL SENTIENCE 1, 2–3 (2016) (examining mourning and grief in non-
human animals); FRANS DE WAAL, MAMA’S LAST HUG: ANIMAL EMOTIONS AND WHAT THEY 
TELL US ABOUT OURSELVES 1 (2019) (examining animal emotions). But cf. Pim Martens et 
al., The Emotional Lives of Companion Animals: Attachment and Subjective Claims by Own-
ers of Cats and Dogs, 29 ANTHROZOÖS 73, 74 (2016) (“relatively sparse” evidence that dogs 
experience secondary emotions like shame and compassion, though some consensus that 
they experience basic emotions like anger and sadness).  
179  Barbara J. King, When Animals Mourn, 309 SCI. AM. 63, 63–64 (2013) (“cetaceans, great 
apes, elephants, and a host of other species ranging from farm animals to domestic pets may, 
depending on circumstances and their own individual personalities, grieve when a relative or 
close friend dies.”). 
180  Benjamin Y. Hayden et al., Fictive Reward Signals in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex, 324 
SCI. 948, 948–50 (2009), https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/498b35_6c8640c6a9e2407dab6c4b 
8be6c3d21f.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4B7-LUHA]; Monkeys Feel Regret like Humans, Study 
Shows, TELEGRAPH (May 14, 2009, 10:13 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/science/5 
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And the “basic emotional circuits” within the brain that govern emotional de-
velopment in humans appear to have close analogues in other vertebrates as 
well.181 Although animal emotions might not in all cases be as advanced or de-
veloped as those of some humans, the emotions are there. According to famed 
primatologist and Professor Frans de Waal,  
For the longest time, science has depicted animals as stimulus-response ma-
chines while declaring their inner lives barren. This has helped us sustain our 
customary “anthropodenial”: the denial that we are animals. We like to see our-
selves as special, but whatever the difference between humans and animals may 
be, it is unlikely to be found in the emotional domain.182 
We afford moral status to all human beings, including people who are se-
verely mentally disabled and infants, although they often cannot cogitate with 
sophistication about what they desire, nor can they plan for the future.183 Thus, 
these features do not appear to be necessary for moral status.184 Further, we typ-
ically do not hold infants or severely mentally disabled adults responsible for 
their actions under the law, and to the extent they are held responsible, the 
death penalty is not applied to them (although it was in the not so distant 
past).185 For example, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that it is unconstitu-
 
324357/Monkeys-feel-regret-like-humans-study-shows.html [https://perma.cc/P5TD-PR47]; 
MARC BEKOFF & JESSICA PIERCE, WILD JUSTICE: THE MORAL LIVES OF ANIMALS 7–8 (2009); 
John Tierney, What Do Animals Regret?, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2009, 5:56 PM), https://tierne 
ylab.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/01/what-do-animals-regret/ [https://perma.cc/T5TR-EG2 
V]. 
181  See Jaak Panskepp, The Basic Emotional Circuits of Mammalian Brains: Do Animals 
Have Affective Lives?, 35 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 1791, 1791–1802 (2011) 
(summarizing evidence on neurological function in nonhuman animals). 
182  Frans de Waal, Your Dog Feels as Guilty as She Looks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/08/opinion/sunday/emotions-animals-humans.html 
[https://perma.cc/VD7F-R9L4]. 
183  But see SUNAURA TAYLOR, BEASTS OF BURDEN: ANIMAL AND DISABILITY LIBERATION 67–
68 (2017) (“One of the most prevalent lines of argument in defense of animals rights is struc-
tured around ableist assumptions about cognitive capacity coupled with a rhetorical instru-
mentalization of disabled people . . . . [A] focus on specific human and neurotypical ‘morally 
relevant abilities’ harms both [animals and intellectually disabled humans].”). 
184  See, e.g., Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, in IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS 13, 15 
(Peter Singer ed., 1985); But, on the significance of higher-order desires for moral status, 
see, e.g., Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. 
PHILOSOPHY 5 (1971). On the significance of planning or agency, see, for example, Michael 
Smith, A Constitutivist Theory of Reasons: Its Promise and Parts, 1 LAW, ETHICS, & PHIL. 9 
(2013). 
185  While some children and mentally disabled adults may be tried and punished for their 
crimes, they cannot be executed. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (“We are 
not persuaded that the execution of mentally retarded criminals will measurably advance the 
deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death penalty . . . . [W]e therefore conclude that 
such punishment is excessive . . . .”); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) 
(holding that it is unconstitutional to impose capital punishment for crimes committed while 
under eighteen years old). But see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 302 (1989) (“Petitioner 
was charged with capital murder in Texas state court. He was found competent to stand trial, 
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tional to impose capital punishment for crimes committed while under the age 
of eighteen.186 That holding was based on evidence founded in science and so-
ciology about the diminished culpability of juvenile offenders.187 Studies sug-
gest that the parts of the brain that govern things like reasoning, judgment, and 
impulse control are not completely developed until a person is in their early 
twenties.188 To this point, the Court stated,  
The susceptibility of juveniles’ to immature and irresponsible behavior means 
“their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an 
adult.”189 . . . Their own vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their 
immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be 
forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment.190 
Although the same should likely hold true for nonhuman animals, they of-
ten experience harm at the hands of our legal system: for example, dogs 
deemed to be dangerous are ordered euthanized, and animals that are used in 
certain crimes—such as dog fighting—often must be held in captivity pending 
the outcome of a trial.191 Although there is generally no need to pardon a baby 
or severely mentally disabled adult because, as was discussed above, they are 
typically not held responsible for their crimes or actions in modern times,192 the 
reasons that we grant pardons would apply with equal force to these humans. 
Thus, those same justifications should also apply to nonhuman animals, who 
 
although a psychologist testified that he was mildly to moderately retarded and had the men-
tal age of a 6 1/2-year-old.”). The law has recently evolved in this area. 
186  Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
187  Id. at 573–74. 
188  Id. at 570, 573. 
189  Id. at 570. 
190  Id.; see also Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472, 477, 479 (2012) (banning mandatory 
life without parole for juvenile offenders, noting that features of juveniles include “immatu-
rity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences” and that these and other 
“distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the 
harshest sentences on juvenile offenders”). 
191  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6414(e) (2019) (“a law enforcement agency may take 
into custody any dog on the premises where the dog fight is alleged to have occurred and any 
dog owned or kept on the premises of any person arrested for unlawful conduct of dog 
fighting”). Of course, some would assert that this is less about punishment of the animal, and 
more about punishment of the person who was using the animal in the commission of a 
crime. See supra Section III.B. 
192  Colorado Governor Bill Ritter posthumously pardoned a man who was executed in 1939. 
See Associated Press, Disabled Man Executed in 1939 Pardoned in Colorado, DESERET 
NEWS (Jan. 7, 2011, 2:56 PM), https://www.deseret.com/2011/1/7/20165526/disabled-man-
executed-in-1939-pardoned-in-colorado [https://perma.cc/69AM-JXTU]. The man had been 
deemed “mental defective” with an IQ of 46. Id.; see also Elizabeth Rapaport, Straight Is the 
Gate: Capital Clemency in the United States from Gregg to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 349, 354 
(2003) (“Of the forty-eight capital clemencies granted in the interest of justice or mercy 
[from 1977 to 2002], only nine have been granted to juveniles, the mentally retarded, or the 
mentally ill because they fell into one (or more than one) of these three categories.” (cita-
tions omitted)); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986) (“For today, no less than be-
fore, we may seriously question the retributive value of executing a person who has no com-
prehension of why he has been singled out and stripped of his fundamental right to life.”). 
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might have more agency than some babies or mentally disabled adults, and who 
are often caused to suffer within the legal system, either due to their own ac-
tions or the actions of their guardians.193 Indeed, these arguments carried to 
their logical conclusions would suggest that, given their diminished capacity, 
vulnerability, and lack of control, no dog should be sentenced to death for 
harming another being. Thus, the use of the pardon power would always be ap-
propriate in the aftermath of dangerous dog determinations. 
In crafting public policy, lawmakers take into account morality and public 
welfare. The goal of public policy is often to ensure more well-being and satis-
faction, and to avoid suffering and dissatisfaction. Thus, there is no clear reason 
for limiting policymakers’ consideration to the well-being of humans only.194 
Indeed, at least with respect to the evolution of human rights, we have seen a 
“repudiat[ion of] any limitation based on the rationality or autonomy of the be-
ings involved.”195 Further, in what Peter Singer calls an “expanding circle,” we 
have tended to relax, rather than strengthen, the criteria for moral status over 
time.196 Put differently, rights-denying arguments, in general, are eventually 
likely to fail. Indeed, some recent court cases embracing the rights of nonhu-
man animals support this viewpoint.197 Thus, the history of punishing animals, 
combined with motivations and reasons behind the pardon power suggest a log-
ical extension of that power to nonhuman animals.198 
B. The Expressive Function of Pardoning Nonhumans: Norm Change and 
Something More Than Mere Property 
This Article has laid out some basic arguments that a governor could use in 
seeking to pardon a dog. It has also considered reasons that a governor might 
want to use the pardon power in this way. But perhaps more important than 
these facets of the discussion is why it matters; what difference does it make if 
a governor chooses to use the pardon power in this way? The answer, I pro-
 
193  But see TAYLOR, supra note 183, at 67–68. 
194  The legislative findings in Oregon’s animal cruelty statutes seem to support this asser-
tion:  
The Legislative Assembly finds and declares that: (1) Animals are sentient beings capable of ex-
periencing pain, stress and fear; (2) Animals should be cared for in ways that minimize pain, 
stress, fear and suffering; (3) The suffering of animals can be mitigated by expediting the dispo-
sition of abused animals that would otherwise languish in cages while their defendant owners 
await trial. . .  
OR. REV. STAT. § 167.305 (2020).  
195  Will Kymlicka & Sue Donaldson, Animals and the Frontiers of Citizenship, 34 OXFORD 
J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 202 (2014).  
196  PETER SINGER, THE EXPANDING CIRCLE: ETHICS, EVOLUTION, AND MORAL PROGRESS 119, 
121 (2011). 
197  Supra Section IV.B. 
198  See Martha C. Nussbaum, Animal Rights: The Need for a Theoretical Basis, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 1506, 1526–46 (2001) (reviewing Steven M. Wise, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD 
LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS (2000)) (discussing a variety of different bases for legal claims 
for nonhuman animals). 
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pose, is that pardoning dogs could work to change norms and further certain 
goals of the animal rights movement, including pursuing a legal status for non-
human animals that is something more robust than mere property. 
As Professor Cass Sunstein stated in a famous article on the topic, the ex-
pressive function of law focuses “on the particular issue of how legal ‘state-
ments’ might be designed to change social norms.”199 Thus, in considering the 
expressive function of the pardon power, it is important to distinguish between 
the approaches used in Maine and New Jersey. As has been stated previously, 
Governor Whitman used her power to remit a forfeiture to free Taro.200 Thus, 
the Governor acted in reliance on Taro’s legal status as the property of his 
guardian, and the dog was let out of jail (literally) because of that status.201 
Whitman’s approach was fairly straightforward from a legal perspective. If 
dogs are property, and property can be forfeited, the Governor can use her re-
mittitur power in deciding to give that property back to its owner. 
However, Whitman’s approach does little to push the boundaries of animal 
law as a substantive field. Relying on forfeiture seems more like an animal wel-
farist tact than an animal rights one;202 as Angela Harris stated, it “accommo-
dates rather than challenges the fundamental demarcation between human and 
non-human.”203 Whitman’s action treads within the existing legal waters of an-
imals-as-property, despite the fact that the headline “Governor Pardons Dog” 
might turn some heads.204 To be sure, the direct result of her action was that the 
dog was able to live; in that way, perhaps her action bolstered a norm that rec-
ognizes the value of nonhuman animal life. However, it does not recognize that 
life as having value separate and apart from its role as the property of a human. 
This is interesting, given that it was two professors who ran an Animal Law 
Clinic at Rutgers Law School—and who are opposed to the animals-as-
property paradigm—who persuaded Governor Whitman to exercise her power 
of remittitur to spare Taro’s life.205 
 
199  Sunstein, supra note 24, at 2024–25. 
200  Supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
201  N. J. Exec. Order No. 7 (Jan. 28, 1994). 
202  Animal welfare proponents believe humans can use animals for food, clothing, and work, 
provided the treatment of those animals falls within “humane” guidelines. Animal rights 
proponents advocate that animals should not be used for human benefit and have rights in 
the same way as humans. What Is the Difference Between “Animal Rights” and “Animal 
Welfare”?, PETA, https://www.peta.org/about-peta/faq/what-is-the-difference-between-ani 
mal-rights-and-animal-welfare [https://perma.cc/6UPU-GZHQ]. 
203  Harris, supra note 96, at 345. 
204  Again, the assumption here is that to remit a forfeiture is the exercise of the pardon pow-
er. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
205  Gary L. Francione & George C. Thomas III, The Wind Was at Our Backs: The Third 
Golden Period of Rutgers Law School, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 471, 476 (2009) (“Francione and 
Charlton succeeded in persuading Governor Christine Whitman to ‘pardon’ Taro, and the 
publicity was nothing short of remarkable.”). This is even more interesting, given that Pro-
fessor Francione is an “abolitionist” who does not support measures that perpetuate the ani-
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Based on the foregoing analysis, it should be clear that Whitman’s action 
carries a very different expressive function than the “full and free pardon” used 
in Maine. In Maine, the dog was treated as any other being whose punishment 
is struck down by the chief executive. LePage’s action showed a willingness to 
treat this nonhuman animal with mercy, and as someone deserving of for-
giveness. (Of course, this is not to say that LePage actually intended his action 
to carry this meaning.)206 Because the focus of the pardon was on the animal 
herself, and her right to continue to live, the pardon expresses and supports val-
ues held by animal rights advocates: specifically, affording moral considera-
tion, value, and worth to the animal in her own right, independent of her con-
nection to a human.207 
The problem with LePage’s approach, of course, is that although it carries 
a powerful expressive message, it is on legally shaky ground.208 Indeed, the 
Judge in Dakota’s case ordered the euthanization to be carried out in spite of 
LePage’s pardon.209 Dakota was set free because the case settled while it was 
being appealed, not as a direct result of the gubernatorial pardon.210 Thus, it is 
possible that the remittitur of forfeiture approach might more certainly result in 
a given dog’s freedom, but without leading toward norm change regarding an-
imals as property. 
Thus, one must consider which is more important: greater certainty in gain-
ing the freedom of a single dog without challenging existing norms, or the ex-
pressive function of the pardon that might lead to norm change. This Article 
has laid out some arguments that could bolster the legal authority of a governor 
to issue a pardon for a dog, but this is a calculus that each individual would 
have to make. Further, from a structural perspective, while saving one dog 
through remittitur might raise awareness of dangerous dog laws, it does nothing 
to address the vast numbers of animals that are killed for food every day, or 
those that are not the property of a human. Thus, I suggest that the expressive 
function of the full and free pardon is more important from a societal stand-
point.211 As many commentators have argued, in order for there to be real, sys-
 
mals-as-property paradigm. See Gary Steiner, Foreword to GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS 
AS PERSONS: ESSAYS ON THE ABOLITION OF ANIMAL EXPLOITATION, at x (2008). 
206  See Sunstein, supra note 24, at 2022 (“[W]hat the agent will be communicating, or be 
taken to mean, may or may not have a great deal to do with his particular intentions. In this 
sense, the meanings of actions are not fully within the agent’s control.”). It is also interesting 
to consider whether governors would continue to pardon dogs if they knew it meant they 
might help animals break free from the property paradigm. 
207  See, e.g., TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 150–94 (2004) (exploring the in-
herent value of animals and universal rights). See generally PETER SINGER, ANIMAL 
LIBERATION (2009) (generally acknowledging that animals should be given equal considera-
tion to avoid suffering). 
208  See supra Section I.B. 
209  Shepherd, supra note 46. 
210  Harrison, supra note 47. 
211  One counterpoint is that promoting the pardon of a dog might in fact serve to reinforce 
hierarchy among species, suggesting that companion animals like dogs are worthy of par-
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temic change, and for animals to gain greater rights under the law, we must 
change the current system in which they are treated as property under the 
law.212 That is unlikely to happen if we continue to enforce and rely upon legal 
apparatus that treat them as such. 
Although animals are viewed as property in all fifty states, commentators 
have long suggested alternative paradigms,213 including viewing animals as 
“living property”214 or “property plus,” or even as persons.215 For example, Pro-
fessor Gary Francione has argued for an abolitionist approach, arguing that the 
treatment of animals will not meaningfully change unless and until their prop-
erty status is rescinded.216 In contrast, Professor David Favre has suggested that 
animal ownership can be transformed into something more akin to guardian-
ship, thus allowing the interests of nonhuman animals to be accommodated 
within a modified version of the property paradigm.217 More recently, scholars 
such as Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka have argued that certain animals, 
like domesticated dogs, should be seen as citizens of their local polity, and that 
citizenship—membership in a specific political community—is morally signifi-
cant and itself generates rights.218 A recent article, authored by Angela Fernan-
dez, suggests a legal status of “quasi-property/quasi-persons,” as a way to,  
 
dons, but the billions of animals killed for food each year are not. Further, it is unclear 
whether members of the general public would understand the technical differences between a 
true pardon and the remittitur of a forfeiture, especially if all of the newspaper headlines re-
fer to the acts using the identical term “pardon.” Thus, it is questionable whether the two 
forms of action would in fact carry vastly different expressive functions. 
212  See, e.g., Petra Renée Wicklund, Abrogating Property Status in the Fight for Animal 
Rights, 107 YALE L.J. 569, 570 (1997) (reviewing GARY L. FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT 
THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1996), and stating that “Fran-
cione now maintains that activists will achieve no progress toward legal rights for animals so 
long as animals remain property”). 
213  At least one commentator has referred to this debate as “paralyzing,” suggesting that the 
goal is the same regardless of how it is reached. Ani B. Satz, Animals as Vulnerable Sub-
jects: Beyond Interest-Convergence, Hierarchy, and Property, 16 ANIMAL L. 65, 71 (2009). 
214  See Carter Dillard et al., Animal Advocacy and Causes of Action, 13 ANIMAL L. 87, 95 
(2006) (proposing the categorization of animals as “living property”). 
215  See generally, Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of Animals, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 389–400 
(2003) (describing different views about animal rights and treatment under the law); David 
Favre, Integrating Animal Interests into Our Legal System, 10 ANIMAL L. 87 (2004) (de-
scribing animal rights movement and personhood arguments); STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING 
THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS (2000) (discussing animals as legal per-
sons); GARY L. FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT (1996) (discussing animals as legal persons). See also TOM REGAN, ANIMAL 
RIGHTS, HUMAN WRONGS: AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY (2003); GARY STEINER, 
ANIMALS AND THE MORAL COMMUNITY: MENTAL LIFE, MORAL STATUS, AND KINSHIP (2008). 
For a discussion of animals being treated as property and “the dreaded comparison,” see 
SPIEGEL, supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
216  See, e.g., Gary L. Francione, Animal Rights Theory and Utilitarianism: Relative Norma-
tive Guidance, 3 ANIMAL L. 75, 95–96 (1997). 
217  See David Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership for Animals, 50 DUKE L.J. 473, 496–97 
(2000) (proposing a model whereby equitable title is awarded to animals themselves). 
218  DONALDSON & KYMLICKA, supra note 87, at 13–14. 
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secur[e] for nonhuman animals (some of) the rights of persons and validating the 
(admittedly weak) ones they already have while leaving intact their current legal 
categorization as property, recognizing and emphasizing that they are a nuanced 
form of property that trigger certain duties and responsibilities in the humans 
who own them or come into contact with them.219 
Although there is a great deal of debate surrounding these questions, com-
mentators agree that treating animals as purely property is unacceptable. 
Further, some courts have begun to recognize that nonhuman animals are 
distinct from typical, inanimate property, and perhaps even more akin to per-
sons.220 For example, in 2013, the Oregon appellate court was considering 
whether the emergency aid exception to the state’s constitutional search war-
rant requirement applies to animals in need.221 Although the state supreme court 
had described the exception in a way that related to “persons,” the appellate 
court stated,  
the court’s description of the exception in human terms is understandable, per-
haps inevitable, given that the few emergency aid cases it has addressed all have 
turned on perceived threats to human safety. The court simply has not been pre-
sented with the question of whether the exception extends to the protection of 
animals . . . .222 
The appellate court noted that the exception was about protecting societal 
interest, and that interest with respect to animals is reflected in numerous state 
animal abuse and neglect statutes.223 Thus, the court held that “the societal in-
terest in protecting nonhuman animals from unnecessary pain, injury, trauma, 
and cruel death can justify—at least in some circumstances—a warrantless 
search or seizure aimed at preventing or alleviating that suffering.”224 
 
219  Angela Fernandez, Not Quite Property, Not Quite Persons: A ‘Quasi’ Approach for 
Nonhuman Animals, 5 CANADIAN J. COMPAR. & CONTEMP. L. 155, 155 (2019). 
220  Steven Wise and the Nonhuman Rights Project have argued for legal personhood of ele-
phants and chimpanzees in a number of court cases. See, e.g., Nonhuman Rts. Project, Inc. 
ex rel. Hercules & Leo v. Stanley, No. 152736/15, at *21–27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July, 29, 2015), 
www.nonhumanrights.org/content/uploads/Judge-Jaffes-Decision-7-30-15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A3S2-WQSV].  
221  State v. Fessenden, 310 P.3d 1163, 1166–67 (Or. Ct. App. 2013). For a discussion of the 
way that the Oregon Court seems to be expanding animals’ legal status as agents (rather than 
objects) in a fashion that is largely agnostic regarding a distinction between property and 
personhood, see Lora Dunn & David B. Rosengard, Comment, A Dog Is Not a Stereo: The 
Role of Animal Sentience in Determining the Scope of Owner Privacy Interests Under Ore-
gon Law, 23 ANIMAL L. 451, 460–61 (2017). 
222  Fessenden, 310 P.3d at 1167 (upholding the warrantless seizure on the basis of general-
ized exigent circumstances, declining to rule on emergency aid, and embracing the notion of 
animals as valid agents, with legally cognizable interests). 
223  Id. at 1168. 
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The same court also recently held that animals qualify as “victims” under a 
state statute.225 In that case, a defendant was found guilty of twenty counts of 
second-degree animal abuse; each count identified a different animal who was 
harmed.226 While the state requested that the trial court impose twenty separate 
convictions, the trial judge determined that “animals are not victims, as defined 
by the statute” because they were not “persons.”227 On appeal, the court re-
versed, finding that the meaning of the word victim was “governed by the legis-
lature’s intent with regard to the underlying substantive criminal statute” and in 
this case, the court found that the legislature sought to protect animals by creat-
ing the crime at hand: second-degree animal abuse.228 The court noted that it 
had, in the past, determined that the legislative intent was for the public as a 
whole, rather than a person or persons, to be the victim of a crime.229 Here, the 
court declined to find that the owner of the animals-as-property was the victim, 
because it would not make sense, given that the owner was the person who 
abused the animals.230 
There are other examples wherein courts and legislatures have extended 
rights or granted special treatment to nonhuman animals that go beyond what 
typical “property” would receive. For example, there are state statutes provid-
ing that an animal can be the beneficiary of a will.231 Similarly, courts have ap-
proved many custody agreements involving pets.232 Animal anti-cruelty laws 
exist in all states, which prohibit the killing or harming of certain animals under 
certain circumstances.233 Some tort cases have given special consideration to 
the death of or harm to an animal.234 Thus, an extension of the pardon power to 
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nonhuman animals serves as another example of animals being treated more 
like persons than property. The more examples like this we are able to gather, 
and the more people become aware of these changes, the more likely it is that 
we will see a change in the norms that surround our views of animals. And that 
type of norm change may lead to a legal paradigm shift toward greater protec-
tion of, and thus rights for, animals. 
CONCLUSION 
The relationship between humans and animals has evolved over time. In 
the United States, people are having fewer children, but welcoming more com-
panion animals into their families.235 People are also spending more money on 
their pets, who have taken on greater importance as members of the family.236 
Indeed, laws often treat companion animals differently from (and better than) 
their counterparts who are used for food and other agricultural products.237 That 
said, Americans are also eating fewer animals than they once did.238 Thus, as 
our relationship with nonhuman animals changes, we can expect the norms and 
laws that are informed by that relationship to change as well.239 And though the 
animals-as-property paradigm is deeply embedded in our jurisprudence, we are 
starting to see some cracks in its foundation. 
This Article has argued that, even if there are some legal questions sur-
rounding its validity, the pardon power serves an important expressive function 
when it is used to free a nonhuman animal. Specifically, by pardoning a non-
human animal, a state is suggesting that mercy toward animals is an important 
societal norm, that animals—like humans—can be forgiven, and that we can 
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free animals from a too-harsh penalty using the same tool that is sometimes 
used for humans. The New Jersey approach, which involved the nullification of 
a forfeiture, lacks that same expressive function of the norm because it relies on 
the fact that animals are property; it fails to recognize the inherent agency and 
value of nonhumans. 
Although the Article recognizes the limitations of using the pardon power 
in this way, governors have begun to do so, and there are signs that such use 
might be expanding.240 By using his or her pardon power to aid nonhuman ani-
mals, governors can also aid in the evolution of both norms and laws surround-
ing the way that we view animals.241 The result might well be a future where 
animals are treated less like property and more like persons. 
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